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INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES IN PRAGMATIC ABILITY 2

Children vary in their ability to use language in social contexts and this has important 
consequences for wellbeing. We review studies that test whether individual differences in 
pragmatic skill are associated with formal language ability, mentalising and executive 
functions in both typical and atypical development. The strongest and most consistent 
associations found were between pragmatic and formal language. Additional associations 
with mentalising were observed, particularly with discourse contingency and irony 
understanding. Fewer studies considered executive function and evidence is mixed.  To make 
progress, high1quality studies of specific pragmatic skills are needed to test mechanistic 
models of development. We propose 6 goals for future research: 1) developing an 
empirically1based taxonomy of pragmatic skills; 2) establishing which skills matter most for 
everyday functioning; 3) testing specific hypotheses about information processing; 4) 
augmenting measures of individual differences; 5) considering a broader set of psychological 
associates; 6) employing statistical tools that model the nested structure of pragmatics and 
cognition.  

 
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People vary enormously in their pragmatic proficiency 1 the extent to which they can 
use language in context to engage with others.  While the domain of pragmatics is not clearly 
delineated or easily defined (Ariel, 2010), the family of pragmatic skills traditionally includes 
the ability to initiate conversation, to respond with contingent, relevant and new information, 
to produce and understand utterances by drawing on context (including the perspectives of 
interlocutors and what is in their common ground), to use an appropriate register (respecting 
social status), to recount cohesive and coherent narratives and to understanding non1literal 
language including irony. While non1verbal communication (e.g., making eye contact, 
smiling and nodding during conversation) is often included in this family of skills, for the 
current review we define pragmatics as the linguistic component of social communication. 
Individual differences in pragmatic ability have profound consequences for all arenas 
of social life. Within the typical population, pragmatic proficiency is positively correlated 
with peer popularity and the ability to engage in collaborative1based learning, and negatively 
correlated with social1emotional and behavioural difficulties, and mental health problems 
(e.g., Gottman, Gonso & Rasmussen, 1975; Helland, Lundervold, Heimann & Posserud, 
2014; Kemple, Speranza & Hazen, 1992; Murphy, Faulkner & Farley, 2014). For people with 
Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD), Social (Pragmatic) Communication Disorder (SCD), and 
Developmental Language Disorder (DLD) impairments in pragmatic skills have a long1term 
impact on relationship formation (e.g., Whitehouse, Watt, Line & Bishop, 2009) 
employability (e.g., Lewis, Woodyatt & Murdoch, 2008; Eaves & Ho, 2008) and behavioural, 
social and emotional problems (e.g., St Clair, Pickles, Durkin & Conti1Ramsden, 2011) 
respectively. Pragmatic language impairments are also strongly associated with other 
developmental disorders including Attention Deficit/ Hyperactivity Disorder (ADHD. 
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INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES IN PRAGMATIC ABILITY 4
Camarata & Gibson, 1999), Oppositional Defiant Disorder (ODD) and Conduct Disorder 
(CD. Gilmour, Hill, Place & Skuse, 2004) as well as hearing loss (e.g., O’Reilly, Peterson, & 
Wellman, 2014). There is thus a clear need to explain why individual differences in 
pragmatic ability exist so that we can find the best means of supporting development and 
function.   
 One way forward is to explore the social and cognitive skills that theoretically 
underpin pragmatic skills.  This research should ultimately contribute to a mechanistic model 
of pragmatic development by identifying potential bottlenecks in function and growth. For 
example, if performance on an inhibition task is shown to be associated with communicative 
perspective taking, then we can build a model of communication whereby inhibiting one’s 
own perspective is a key sub1step. Of course, this approach has its limitations, most notably 
because it relies on finding measures with the requisite variance for correlational work to be 
carried out. It is possible that some steps in deploying a pragmatic skill are so readily 
achieved by all speakers as to show no variance (and we would not be able to distinguish this 
from a case where the step was not required at all). However, the assumption is that a 
correlational approach will be informative often enough to offer insight into the architecture 
of the developing language system. With a model of this system in hand, we will be better 
able to predict developmental outcomes, identify children at risk, create supportive 
interventions, and match these interventions to individuals who stand to benefit from them 
the most.  
 Of all the cognitive domains that could be important for pragmatic functioning, three 
have received the most attention: 	
	 proficiency (vocabulary and grammar), 
	 (Theory of Mind) and 

 (including inhibition and working 
memory amongst others). The goal of this review paper was to establish what evidence there 
is of broad1brush associations between each of these domains and pragmatics and of more 
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INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES IN PRAGMATIC ABILITY 5
specific links. Testing for the latter is a challenge because it requires 1) a good information 
processing account of why a specific social or cognitive process would be implicated in a 
specific pragmatic function, 2) good measures for each domain, and 3) control measures to 
rule out the possibility that associations reflect more domain general ability. Even when these 
considerable challenges are met, theoretically anticipated collinearity between variables can 
make null findings hard to interpret. One further question to consider is therefore how often 
informative studies result from taking an individual differences approach.  
 For a paper to be included in this review, it needed to report both a measure of at least 
one of the three cognitive domains (formal language, mentalising, executive function) and the 
relation to a measure of pragmatic skill (see Appendix A for key words, search strategy and 
inclusion criteria). Complete findings of all papers identified in a systematic search are 
reported in table 1, Appendix B, with effect sizes reported in terms of Cohen’s d, where we 
consider d=0.2 a 'small' effect size, 0.5 a 'medium' effect size and 0.8 a 'large' effect size 
(Cohen, 1992). While we wanted to include a broad range of literature, setting a wide scope 
for the search process means there will inevitably be gaps and missed papers. Furthermore, 
the review reports only published studies and does not address the possibility that the 
literature is biased in favour of reporting positive results over negative ones (something that 
is known to be a problem in the cognitive literature more broadly. E.g., De Bruin, Treccani & 
Della Sala, 2015). We therefore provide a representative review of research on this broad 
topic rather than an exhaustive summary. 
 Notwithstanding these caveats, having analysed over 50 papers, it would be fair to say 
that there is evidence that formal language, mentalising and executive functions are all 
broadly implicated in pragmatic function but evidence for specific associations with well1
defined pragmatic skills is currently limited. There appear to be two main reasons for this. 
First, the information processing rationale for an expected association between a given 
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pragmatic measure and a given social or cognitive measure is often underspecified. Second, 
methodological problems often limit the conclusions that can be drawn due to sample size, 
measurement quality, lack of variance, task specific demands or lack of control for likely 
covariates. Nonetheless, in some cases, there is good evidence of specific links and we 
highlight these in the main text of the review before sketching proposals for future research.  
 In what follows, we first introduce pragmatic measures commonly reported in the 
reviewed studies.  We then present the main body of the review, which is organised 
according to the three domains: formal language, mentalising and executive function. At the 
start of the three sections, a summary of findings is given followed by more detailed results 
organised by type of pragmatic measure (global assessments, naturalistic conversation, 
referential communication, narrative, irony comprehension). A reader seeking the gist of the 
argument could follow the summaries before heading to the discussion section.  

 Measures of pragmatic skills vary in terms of focus, coverage and quality (see Adams, 
2002; O’Neill, 2014; Russell & Grizzle, 2008 for reviews).  In order to aid interpretation of 
the following correlational research, we briefly describe the measures most commonly 
reported in the individual differences literature. 
   The most frequently used global tests of pragmatics are the 
subscales from the Comprehensive Assessment of Spoken Language, (CASL, Carrow1
Woolfolk, 1999). For the 	
	
children respond to a scenario with 
the appropriate thing to say or do (e.g., “Suppose the telephone rings. You pick it up. What 
do you say?”). On the 	
	 subscale, children explain the nonliteral meaning 
of statements (e.g., “When 51year1old Jimmy started pulling his sister’s hair, Dad said, "Jim, 
you’re not a puppy anymore." What did he mean?”). Other standardised tests (the ELI battery 
(Saborit & Julian, 2005) and the Test of Pragmatic Language (TOPL; Phelps1Terasaki & 
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INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES IN PRAGMATIC ABILITY 7
Phelps1Gunn, 1992) also involve generating pragmatically appropriate responses to presented 
scenarios and are therefore meta1cognitive in nature.  
 One commonly used global clinical assessment is the Autism Diagnostic Observation 
Schedule (ADOS, Lord et al., 2000). This contains many measures of the pragmatic skills 
considered in this review (such as the ability to initiate or respond appropriately in verbal 
interaction) alongside measures of non1verbal social interaction (e.g. appropriate eye1gaze 
and use of gestures) and some measures that do not specifically relate to communication at all 
(e.g. imagination, understanding of romantic relationships).   
 Other measures of global pragmatic ability rely on parent/teacher reports, which have 
the advantage of gauging a broad range of abilities outside of a test situation – i.e., they 
measure pragmatic function in a range of real social contexts. Questionnaires in reviewed 
studies include the Children’s Communication Checklist (in either its original version or in its 
current version as the CCC2, Bishop, 2003), the Language Use Inventory (LUI, O’Neill, 
2009) and the Mindful Conversational Difficulties Scale (MCDS; Peterson, Garnett Kelly & 
Attwood, 2009). The CCC2 was designed to screen for potential communication disorders 
and sub1classify children from four years of age.  It includes four subscales that can be 
considered pragmatic (E – initiation; F – stereotyped language; G – use of context and H – 
non1verbal communication). Many researchers now use it to study individual differences 
although studies differ in terms of which subscales are included because a pragmatic 
composite is no longer available (Norbury, Nash, Baird & Bishop, 2004).  The LUI is a 
relatively new standardized parent report for assessing how younger children (18 months to 4 
years) use language in everyday situations and also has the advantage of covering a broad 
range of skills. It is intended to capture functions of language that develop in tandem with 
children’s growing social1cognitive understanding (O’Neill, 2007). The MDCS consists of 
eight questions, five of which tap language use requiring some level of perspective taking 
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INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES IN PRAGMATIC ABILITY 8
(e.g., ‘Does the child frequently switch or omit topics in a conversation so that others become 
confused?’). However, it also includes two items that directly tap mentalising. 
 !

. Measures of conversational skill rely on a researcher engaging in 
semi1structured conversation with a child and then later analysing what is said with detailed 
coding schemes. They have the advantage of being direct measures of a skill that requires 
many pragmatic functions to come together in concert and have high ecological validity. 
However, this very advantage can lead to challenges with quantitative assessment as no two 
conversational turns are the same. Common measures include the production of 
conversational turns that are related to what one’s interlocutor has just said and that provide 
relevant or new information.  Given the importance of assessing conversation for clinical 
diagnosis (using DSM1V), future development of measures is a priority (Norbury, 2014).  
 "


. Tests of referential communication tend to forgo 
ecological validity for precision of assessment. They generally tap a very specific skill, either 
producing or comprehending expressions that refer to objects by taking into account what an 
interlocutor can see or has previously experienced.  They can be useful for isolating the use 
of specific social and cognitive processes. 
 #. Tests of narrative generally involve children retelling a story (e.g., the 
standardized Renfrew Bus Story Test, Renfrew, 2010) or narrating a wordless picture book 
(with studies differing according to whether the book can be seen at the time of narration) 
although they sometimes also include a comprehension element (e.g., Multilingual 
Assessment Instrument for Narratives: LITMUS1MAIN, Gagarina et al., 2012). Like 
conversation, producing narratives is culturally universal but cognitively challenging –its 
complexity is what makes for an ecologically valid test of advanced, real world language use. 
The properties of narrative that are coded vary widely from one study to another and picking 
out specifically pragmatic aspects of narrative production is a known challenge (e.g., 
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INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES IN PRAGMATIC ABILITY 9
Ketelaars, Jansonius, Cuperus, and Verhoeven, 2012). Commonly coded properties are 
management of common ground (including referring to characters so they are accessible to 
the listener), inclusion of (ir)relevant information, cohesion and coherence (although the 
latter is not always considered pragmatic). Any correlations observed should thus be 
interpreted with respect to a specific coding scheme. When doing so, it is worth considering 
what succeeding on a given measure would require of the speaker. For example, many 
aspects of narrative production may not necessitate perspective1taking (e.g., Arnold, Bennetto 
& Diehl, 2009). 
 	
. Tests of irony generally require the comprehension of short stories in which 
one character, the ironist, dir cts a sarcastic comment to another. Test questions vary but 
generally tap understanding of: 1) whether the comment was meant literally (	), 2) 
whether the ironist believed the literal content of his comment and whether the ironist 
thought the other character would believe that he thought the literal content to be true () 
and 3) why the ironist would have said what they did ().  Again, these tests 
generally require meta1linguistic insight.  





 For want of better expressions, researchers often distinguish 	
	 
from 	. This distinction is somewhat artificial for a few reasons. While it 
makes sense to talk about linguistic forms (speech sounds and grammatical structures) and 
their functions (semantic or pragmatic), measures of ‘formal language’ are at best tests of the 
semantic functions of language forms: they test whether children understand the meanings of 
words and sentences. To the extent that there is no clear division between semantics and 
pragmatics, it is inevitably difficult to construct tests that tap separable domains. When 
understanding words and sentences, we often engage in reasoning that would be considered 
pragmatic (indeed for social cognitive theories of language development such processes are 
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INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES IN PRAGMATIC ABILITY 10
fundamental, see Clark, 2005). Likewise, nominally pragmatic tests call on lexical and 
grammatical knowledge. Nonetheless, the distinction has been found to be useful in the sense 
that some children appear to have difficulties that are most noticeable when there is a need to 
use language in a social context (as is the case for children with ASD: Adams, Green, 
Gilchrist & Cox, 2002; Jones & Schwartz, 2009; Loukusa & Moilanen, 2009; Tager1
Flusberg, Paul & Lord, 2005; Volden, 2002). Therefore, when seeking to explain individual 
differences in pragmatic skills, it makes sense to consider them potentially separable (at least 
partially) from formal language and then to test the extent to which in practice they are 
related.  
 With a few notable exceptions, most studies we review below find evidence of a 
medium to large correlation between pragmatic and formal language measures. This is 
consistently the case for studies with a global measure of pragmatic ability (direct or parent 
reported), naturalistic conversation or irony comprehension. Studies that focus on perspective 
taking in referential communication paradigms or on narrative production report more mixed 
results. However, it is not always clear what associations would be predicted for these 
measures. Overall, there is sufficient evidence of an association with formal language ability 
that, later in the review, it will be necessary to look for controls for formal language when 
exploring evidence for specific links between pragmatics, mentalising and executive 
functioning. 
  .  Due to their wide1ranging nature, there are any 
number of reasons why global pragmatic measures may be associated with formal language. 
At best such measures allow us to establish whether these two domains are linked such that 
more specific measures can unpack why. There is consistent evidence of a medium to large 
association with formal language for typically developing children (Bernard & Deleau, 2007; 
De Rosnay, Fink, Begeer, Slaughter, & Peterson, 2014), children with ASD (Volden, 
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Coolican, Garon, White & Bryson, 2009; Akbar, Loomis, & Paul, 2013; Whyte & Nelson, 
2015), children with Developmental Language Disorder (DLD, Andrés1Roqueta, Adrian, 
Clemente, & Katsos, 2013), deaf children (Rinaldi, Baruffaldi, Burdo, & Caselli, 2013) and a 
group of children covering the full range of pragmatic abilities on the normed LUI measure 
(Pesco & O'Neill, 2012).  
 #

  Engaging in fluid conversation calls on formal language 
skills that allow the rapid processing of incoming speech and planning of speaker turns. Two 
studies of children with ASD found large correlations between conversational ability and 
formal language (Capps, Kehres & Sigman, 1998; Hale & Tager1Flusberg, 2005), providing 
consistent evidence of an association.  
 "


 Studies focused on referential communication report 
more mixed results. This might be because, for some studies, measuring individual 
differences was not the focus of the study and/or sample sizes were small. Furthermore, 
referential communication tasks are often designed to have limited formal language demands, 
with simple instructions that are within the grasp of young participants. For example, if 
requested to “pick up the big cup”, a 31year1old might not struggle to understand the 
instruction (but may struggle to take into account their partner’s visual perspective when 
selecting a cup). Thus, the language demands of the test may not be the most important 
bottleneck in successful performance. Nonetheless, we might still predict an association 
between the domains if we assume that more experience of linguistic interactions (and more 
facility with learning from them) would result in both better vocabulary comprehension and 
better ability to accommodate an interlocutor’s perspective (e.g., Matthews, Butcher, Lieven 
& Tomasello, 2012).   
 Looking at typical development, Nilsen and Graham (2009, 2012) found mixed 
evidence of an association between vocabulary and egocentric errors of different kinds 
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whereas Gillis and Nilsen (2014) found a medium1sized correlation between formal language 
and children’s ratings of the helpfulness of ambiguous messages. Research on atypical 
populations also finds for children with ASD both mixed results (Fukumura, 2016), on the 
one hand, as well as, on the other hand, evidence of an association (Dahlgren & Dahlgren 
Sandberg, 2008; Nadig, Vivante & Ozonoff, 2009) and DLD (Davies, Andrés1Roqueta, & 
Norbury, 2016).  
 #. The production of narrative necessarily calls on vocabulary, grammar and 
knowledge of language structure at the supra1sentential level. Separating these skills from 
more pragmatic aspects of narrative production (e.g., managing information flow for a 
listener) is a challenge and findings are mixed. Fernández (2013) observed a medium sized 
correlation between receptive vocabulary and overall coherence of narratives but not other 
measures. Blom and Boerma (2016) found medium sized correlations between formal 
language measures and concurrent measures of narrative comprehension and production 
(macrostructure) for children with DLD.  For their typically developing group, however, very 
few such associations were observed. De Marchena and Eigsti (2016) found no association 
between receptive vocabulary and narrative adaptation to common ground in children with 
ASD (although the authors note that participants were selected to be in the typical range for 
vocabulary). Losh and Capps (2003) found no correlations between verbal IQ and narrative 
measures including evaluation in very high functioning children with ASD. Norbury, 
Gemmel and Paul (2014) found that while formal language ability (assessed by the CELF, 
Semel, Wiig & Secord, 1995) did not correlate with pragmatic error for a DLD group, it was 
negatively correlated with pragmatic errors for their ASD group.  However, it was also 
negatively correlated with relevant propositions (11.35), suggesting that more verbally able 
children with ASD may be more verbose but are then prone to more irrelevance.  
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  	
. Since tests of irony comprehension usually require understanding short 
stories, they also necessarily call on receptive vocabulary and grammar.  Performance on 
corresponding tests could be related for this reason alone. Understanding the ironic element 
of these stories specifically could also plausibly be linked to language ability through 
language experience. That is, children with more experience of language will have larger 
vocabularies and more incidental practice with this aspect of non1literal language use (see, 
e.g., O’Reilly, Peterson & Wellman, 2014, for evidence of delay in deaf children of hearing 
parents). The relatively large literature on this topic reports consistent evidence of medium1
large associations with formal language ability for typically developing children (Filippova & 
Astington, 2008; Angeleri & Airenti, 2014; Massaro, Valle & Marchetti, 2014; Mewhort1
Buist & Nilsen, 2013; Nilsen, Glenwright & Huyder, 2011). Studies of children with ASD 
(Huang, Oi & Taguchi, 2015; Nicholson, Whalen & Pexman, 2013) and ADHD (Adachi et 
al., 2004; Caillies, Bertot, Motte, Raynaud & Abely, 2014) did not find relationships with the 
particular formal language measure used although parent report measures may not have been 
sensitive enough.  All things considered, there tends to be an association with receptive 
vocabulary, certainly in typical development.  
 $. Many tests of pragmatics have clear formal language demands and this is 
reflected in a consistent pattern of medium1large associations for all measures except tests 
that deliberately seek to minimise demands on vocabulary and grammar. This would suggest 
that formal language and pragmatic language are not entirely separable, a conclusion 
consistent with studies of atypical development that find children with DLD to be impaired 
relative to typical controls on many measures of pragmatic language (e.g. Norbury, Nash, 
Baird & Bishop, 2004; Norbury, Gemmel & Paul, 2014) even if children with ASD show 
greater pragmatic impairments (e.g., Colozzo, Morris & Mirenda, 2015; Norbury & Bishop, 
2003; see also Miller et al., 2015).  It is therefore clear that future studies should control for 
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formal language ability if they are to look for specific links between pragmatics and other 
domains. This said, from the current research it is not possible to rule out Matthew effects 
(Merton, 1968; Stanovich, 1986) whereby children with high scores on pragmatic and formal 
language tests would have had high scores on many other tests, including non1verbal IQ. An 
important step for the field will be to do the necessary factor analytic work to gauge the 
extent to which pragmatic and formal language skills reflect a single underlying factor, and 
the extent to which they are separable from each other and from other social and cognitive 
dimensions, or indeed reflect a domain general construct (e.g., ‘g’, Gustafsson, 1984) at 
certain points in development.  






 The term mentalising is used here to encompass children’s understanding of 
themselves and others as mental beings who are guided by their attentional states, beliefs, 
desires, intentions, emotions, interests and perspectives. Mentalising (or Theory of Mind, 
ToM) has traditionally been seen as the most important cognitive underpinning of pragmatics 
(e.g., Baron1Cohen, 1988; Geurts, Broeders & Nieuwland, 2010; Perner, Frith, Leslie & 
Leekam, 1989). Under O’Neill’s (2012) pragmatic taxonomy, one of the three main sets of 
pragmatic skills is labelled ‘mindful pragmatics’, grouping together instances of language use 
that require taking the perspective of a specific interlocutor (as opposed to having a model of 
interlocutors in general, or a routine social situation). On the face of it, having difficulties 
recognising such perspectives should cause communication problems. However, mentalising 
may not be a unitary construct, particularly in terms of the distinction between understanding 
the emotions of others versus understanding their knowledge states. Therefore, part of the 
challenge of research is to identify which types of mentalising are necessary in specific 
communicative situations. To date, the vast majority of research has focused on false belief 
understanding. Yet, for many pragmatic tasks it is not always clear why this would be called 
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upon and so an important question is whether it can be taken as a proxy for mentalising 
ability more generally or not. Another aspect of the challenge is to unpack the evolving 
association between mentalising and pragmatic development given that each is likely to 
influence the other. Indeed, there is a large body of research highlighting the importance of 
language exposure for typical development of theory of mind (e.g., Astington & Wild, 2006; 
de Rosnay & Hughes, 2005; Dunn, Brown, Slomkowski, Tesla & Youngblade, 1991; 
Hughes, 2011; Hughes, et al., 2005; Milligan, Astington & Dack, 2007).  
 Overall, where studies have managed to run tests of mentalising that yield substantial 
variance, this tends to be associated with individual differences in pragmatic function, 
especially for global pragmatic measures, conversational ability and irony comprehension. 
For many of these studies, few control variables are taken into account and so the specificity 
of the association is unclear. For others, when language is controlled for, the association 
remains providing strong evidence for a sp cific link between mentalising (particularly 2
nd
 
order ToM – knowing that person A thinks that person B thinks something) and both 
conversation skills and irony comprehension, although notably no studies have included a 
control measure of non1verbal IQ. Occasionally, once controls are accounted for, no 
association between mentalising and pragmatic function remains (e.g., Pellicano, 2013; 
Whyte & Nelson, 2015). In these cases, it is not always easy to know whether this is because 
mentalising is not the limiting factor for the type of pragmatic ability assessed (something 
that is hard to establish when global measures are used) or whether all the variance in 
mentalising was already lost in the soup of control variables that are known to co1vary with 
it. It might be possible to solve this problem but it is also possible that we are trying to hone 
in on dimensions of cognitive function that cannot exist in isolation from each other – raising 
questions about the limits of individual differences research.  Finally, for studies of 
referential communication and narrative production, the evidence of an association with 
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mentalising, often assessed as 1st order false belief, is mixed. This could sometimes be due to 
lack of variance in measures and/or a mismatch between the mentalising skill tested and the 
mentalising demands of the pragmatic task.  In sum, while there is enough evidence of a 
broad1brush link between the two domains, we now need to pin down specifically how this 
link is substantiated for individual pragmatic functions.   
  . Studies of typical development that have explored 
how mentalising relates to a broad measure of pragmatic ability consistently find a medium 
to large association.  Bernard and Deleau (2007) found medium to large correlations between 
a composite false belief measure and a composite measure of communicative perspective 
taking at all three time points (3;8, 4;2, 4;8) in their longitudinal study.  Likewise, De 
Rosnay, Fink, Begeer, Slaughter, and Peterson (2014) found a large correlation between 
mindful conversational competence and ToM, a relationship that remained after covariates 
including age, receptive vocabulary, emotion understanding and shyness were controlled for. 
This suggests that measures taken from traditional assessments of false belief understanding 
can predict real1world use of mentalising for conversation. However, one quarter of  the 
items on de Rosnay et al.’s (2014) measure of conversational competence were measures of 
mentalising so the specificity of association is not clear.  
 Looking at atypical development,  one study that stands out from the point of view of 
tackling the methodological challenges of indvidual differences research is reported by Losh, 
Martin, Klusek, Hogan1Brown, and Sideris (2012). ToM was assessed using one of two 
batteries (made up of tasks from published studies) depending on the child’s developmental 
level.  Both batteries included the same test of perspective taking and this allowed the 
development of a single theory of mind scale onto which all children could be mapped. This 
is a good solution to the problem of needing measures with sufficient variance. Large 
correlations were observed between this ToM score and performance on the pragmatic 
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judgment subtest of the CASL for children with ASD, Fragile X Syndrome, Down Syndrome 
and neuro1typical children. Two further studies provide support for this association between 
pragmatic ability and concurrent mentalising (Whyte & Nelson, 2015, for TD children and 
children with ASD; Andrés1Roqueta et al., 2013, for children with DLD). 
 One problem with research on the association between mentalising and pragmatic 
skills is that other co1variates are not always controlled for. When they are, the picture 
regarding associations becomes mixed (e.g., Whyte & Nelson, 2015). One study of high 
functioning children with ASD found no role for mentalising in explaining variance on the 
ADOS1G once a range of other factors had been controlled for. Pellicano (2013) found a 
large negative association between ToM at time 1 and communication problems at time 2 
(i.e, better ToM, fewer problems). However, when age, verbal ability, and non1verbal ability 
were partialled out, this association did not hold (only early differences in executive function 
scores remained related to later ADOS1G scores – see EF section below). It is difficult to 
interpret this absence of correlation (since absence of evidence is not evidence of absence), 
an issue we return to in the discussion.  
 Overall, there is some evidence of an association between mentalising and global 
assessments of pragmatic function but the specificity of this association is currently unclear.  
 !

While extent of engagement in a conversation can vary, one 
needs, at a minimum, to attend to an interlocutor’s conversational turn, understand it and 
respond, ideally by taking into account common ground, the question under discussion, and 
interlocutor interests. In a study of peer interaction in typically developing 41year1olds, 
Slomskowski and Dunn (1996) found a large correlation between connectedness of peer 
conversation and performance on 1st order false belief tasks. An initial study of children with 
ASD (Capps et al., 1998) found that, once formal language had been controlled for, there was 
no evidence of a specific association between mentalising ability and provision of new and 
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relevant information.  However, when Hale and Tager1Flusberg (2005) followed up on this 
by using a more extensive battery of ToM tests (to avoid the possibility that lack of variance 
was responsible for null findings), they observed that once age, IQ and vocabulary score were 
controlled for, ToM explained additional variance (8%) in the amount of speech that was 
contingent on what their partner had said. This study provided good evidence for a role of 
mentalising. However, it is worth noting that the ToM scale included items (e.g., about lies 
and jokes) that directly tap nominally pragmatic abilities and it is not clear which aspects of 
the ToM tasks related to conversational proficiency. Unpacking this association is an 
important challenge for future research.    
 "


Studies of referential communication require children 
to take common ground into account – i.e., to assess whether a partner can see something that 
is being referred to or whether they have prior experience with it. There is tentative evidence 
that referential communication ability is related to mentalising. For example, Resches and 
Perez1Pereira (2007) found evidence of large correlations between mentalising 
(knowledge/ignorance and false belief combined) and some (but not all) measures of 
performance on a highly motivating task that required children to describe to a peer the 
location of hidden treasure (a location that the director child had previously experienced but 
the hunter child had not). Similar mixed results are reported by Maridaki1Kassotaki and 
Antonopoulou (2011) and Dahlgren and Dahlgren Sandberg (2008). Overall, studies on 
referential communication and mentalising have not resulted in a consistent picture, 
sometimes because of a lack of variance on key measures. Furthermore, studies do not 
always control for formal language or assess the specific mentalising skill that is presumed to 
be required for the referential communication task. That is, if the task requires adjusting 
language production according to what an interlocutor can see, we would expect success to 
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correlate with a measure of level 1 visual perspective taking but not necessarily with tests of 
false belief understanding.  
 #Producing a narrative potentially calls on mentalising in that one could 
model the listener’s (or at least a generic listener’s) epistemic state in order to manage 
information flow for them (e.g., introducing characters appropriately, maintaining 
accessibility of story elements as the narrative progresses, building up tension and 
resolution). However, evidence regarding the link between mentalising and narrative 
production is mixed. Fernández (2013) found no correlation between any of four measures of 
narrative quality and 1
st
 order ToM scores (perhaps due to a ceiling effect on the latter) but 
did observe a medium correlation with 2
nd
 order ToM and narrative coherence. Ketelaars, 
Jansonius, Cuperus, and Verhoeven (2012) found no evidence of an association between 1st 
order ToM and narrative organization (amount of relevant content) or cohesion (use of 
anaphora and deixis as cohesive devices) for children with SCD or typically developing 
children. Capps, Losh and Thurber (2000) found, for a group of children with ASD (but not a 
group with developmental delay), a correlation between 1st order false belief understanding 
and a range of narrative properties including evaluatuative statements and mention of mental 
state terms, although only the latter remained once language ability was controlled for.  Losh 
and Capps (2003) found no correlations between advanced ToM (strange stories) and 
narrative measures including evaluation in high functioning children with ASD, although 
associations with emotion understanding were observed. Kuijper, Hartman and Hendriks 
(2015) found that 1st and 2nd order ToM were predictors of appropriate referent 
reintroduction (using a noun instead of a pronoun), with 2
nd
 order ToM remaining predictive 
in a multivariate model. In sum, it is hard to pinpoint which measures of narrative we should 
consider ‘pragmatic’ (see related discussion in O’Neill, 2014 on anaphora) and, given the 
range of different options and mixed evidence, it is hard to come to any solid conclusions. 
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However, given the importance of narrative production as a human activity (Bruner, 1990), 
future work could aim at a consensus on measures of interest and then establish the extent to 
which these depend on formal language skills or social cognition.  
 	
 The understanding of irony should theoretically be related to higher order 
theory of mind in that it requires understanding that a speaker  their addressee will 
 they are not being literal, and understanding the speaker’s attitude in producing the 
statement. The literature tends to confirm that this is the case. In a particularly well1
controlled study, Filippova and Astington (2008) assessed 2nd order false belief, receptive 
vocabulary, forwards and backwards digit span and the ability to detect emotions from 
prosodic cues. There was a large correlation between 2
nd
 order ToM and irony 
comprehension. Regression models showed that even once age, memory, attunement to 
prosody and receptive vocabulary were controlled for, ToM was a significant predictor of 
irony comprehension (explaining an additional 4% of variance). This study was notable in 
clearly spelling out why a specific type of mentalising should be associated with a specific 
pragmatic skill and then testing for the association while carefully controlling for relevant 
covariates.  
 Several more studies support this association. Nilsen et al. (2011) pinpointed a 
medium1large relationship between 2nd order false belief and a measure of children’s 
sensitivity to the effect of a listener’s knowledge state on their understanding of a speaker’s 
ironic intentions. A further five studies of irony comprehension in typically developing 
children also found a relationship with ToM although they did not control for formal 
language ability (Massaro, et al., 2014;  Banasik, 2013(mixed results); Mewhort1Buist & 
Nilsen; 2013 (mixed results); Angeleri & Airenti, 2014; Nicholson, Whalen & Pexman 
2013). Massaro, Valle and Marchetti (2014) is the only study of typically developing children 
that did not find evidence of a relationship between ToM and irony interpretation.  However, 
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this study used few items for both measures. Finally, in a study of children with ADHD, 
Caillies et al. (2014) found a large correlation between 2nd order false belief understanding 
and irony comprehension. Taken together, there is good evidence of an association between 
2nd order mental state reasoning and irony comprehension. An important question for future 
research is the extent to which this relation is observed because many 2
nd
 order ToM tests tap 
essentially pragmatic skills.  



%&


 Executive Functions (EFs) are a set of higher order skills that allow individuals to 
think and behave in a flexible, controlled and goal1directed way (Diamond, 2013). Working 
memory, inhibition and cognitive flexibility are the EFs most commonly reported in the 
literature on pragmatic development, although organisation, planning, self1control and 
generativity are also considered. It is intuitively plausible that any of these would be called 
upon for pragmatic function.  Language us  regularly requires us to hold in mind and update 
linguistic and contextual information (working memory), suppress one’s own perspective 
(inhibition), flexibly respond as a discourse unfolds (cognitive flexibility), think ahead to 
what will be communicated (planning), order information to form cohesive and coherent 
narratives (organisation) and develop new topics of conversation (generativity). Limits on 
any of these abilities are likely to shape the course of typical pragmatic development and 
potentially explain departure from the normal trajectory for many children with 
developmental disorders.  
 Deficits in executive functions have been implicated in a number of neuro1
developmental disorders (e.g., Kingdon et al., 2016; Lai et al., 2017; Landry & Al1Taie, 
2016; Sjöwal et al., 2013). While many assume that executive problems cause pragmatic 
problems, some have flipped the question and asked whether language impairments can 
explain deficits in executive function (e.g., Akbar, Loomis, & Paul, 2013), for example, 
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because inner speech is needed to regulate non1routine behaviours (Joseph, McGrath, & 
Tager1Flusberg, 2005; Ren, Wang & Jarrold, 2016).  Thus any link between the two domains 
is at least theoretically bi1directional.  
 Perhaps the most important point to bear in mind while interpreting reported 
associations below is that there is currently little consensus in the field of executive function 
about what the different types of EF are, how they relate to each other and how reliable 
measures of them are. Wiebe et al. (2011) suggest that early on in development EF is a 
unitary, domain general construct.  For adults, Miyake et al.’s (2008; 2012) factor analytic 
work found separable but correlated factors. We are therefore in the tricky business of 
looking for associations between two domains (EF and pragmatics) for which the 
dimensional structure is unclear and likely to change over developmental time. The adult 
psycho1linguistic literature further suggests that evidence of correlations will be patchy 
because the types of cognitive support call d on, for example, in communicative perspective1
taking, are highly task specific (Ryksin et al. 2015), anticipated effect sizes are small (and 
sample sizes are often not large enough to detect them), and measurement reliability for both 
domains is suboptimal (Brown1Schmidt & Fraundorf, 2015; Hedge, Powell & Sumner, 
2017).   
 With these substantial caveats in mind, overall, the research reviewed below does 
suggest that executive functions are globally associated with pragmatic functions, as we 
would expect. Beyond this, however, a consistent picture is yet to emerge. There is evidence 
of inhibitory control affecting performance on some tests of communicative perspective 
taking, and of a relationship between working memory and the ability to respond 
contingently in conversation. However, the latter needs to be followed up since there is some 
debate about the order of dependence between working memory and language development 
(e.g., Jones et al., 2014).  There has been less work on other EFs but there is some evidence 
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that cognitive flexibility may be an important bottleneck early on, particularly in the process 
of repair. Less well1studied abilities that are arguably executive in nature, like generativity, 
also emerge as potentially important for language use in social contexts.  Certainly, research 
on atypical development suggests that poor executive function is often associated with 
pragmatic difficulties. Precisely why this is the case is not yet clear.  
  
When global measures of executive 
function and pragmatics are used, there is evidence of a broad1brush association between the 
two domains. Thus, in a study of high functioning children with ASD, Pellicano (2013) 
observed a large negative association between an aggregate EF measure at time 1 (assessing 
planning, cognitive flexibility and inhibition) and social communication problems (ADOS1G) 
at time 2. This association remained when age, verbal ability, and non1verbal ability at time 1 
were partialled out, leading Pellicano to argue that EFs are likely to place direct constraints 
on the development of social communicative behaviour (i.e., they do not only exert an 
influence via mentalising). While the composite task used here had the advantage of factoring 
out task specific variance and reducing risk of type I error (because it avoids running many 
correlations, one for each EF measure), the next step is to break down this broad1brush 
association to look at specific executive functions. There are relatively few studies that have 
looked for links between specific EFs and global pragmatic ability but some have 
investigated inhibition, working memory and generativity. 
 Regarding inhibition, Rints, McAuley, and Nilsen (2015) found that children whose 
parents rated them as more inattentive or hyperactive1impulsive also rated them as having 
poorer pragmatic skills on the LUI. They also found a large correlation between inhibition 
(movement errors on a statue task) and pragmatic scores on the Pragmatic Judgment subtest 
of the CASL. In contrast, Akbar, Loomis, and Paul (2013) found no correlation between this 
subtest of the CASL and inhibition (a colour1word interference test) in a study of children 
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with ASD.  Finally, in a study of children with DLD, Andrés1Roqueta, Adrian, Clemente, and 
Katsos (2013) found that inhibition was associated with pragmatic proficiency. Thus, 
evidence is currently mixed. 
 Regarding working memory, links to global pragmatic function in children with ASD 
have been observed, although the direction of causation is assumed to be from language to 
executive function. Akbar, Loomis, and Paul (2013) found a large correlation between 
performance on the pragmatic judgement subtest of the CASL and both working memory and 
organisation (but not with cognitive flexibility or inhibition).   
 Regarding generativity, there is evidence that the ability to fluently generate novel 
ideas (i.e., thinking of all the possible uses of a pencil or all the possible interpretations of an 
abstract line drawing) is associated with general pragmatic function. Bishop and Norbury 
(2005) derived a composite pragmatic language score (from the CCC pragmatic composite, 
the SCQ communication scale, and ADOS–G) for children with a range of related 
development disorders (DLD, SCD, ASD) and found a large correlation with generativity. An 
association held when structural language and age were controlled for. The authors proposed 
that generation of relevant ideas is needed to consider multiple possible meanings of an 
utterance and to avoid restricting conversation to specific topics or have it depart on 
unexpected tangents.  This study was also interesting in that it took a dimensional approach 
and included children with different diagnostic labels in the same anal ses. 
 !

  Although intuitively conversation should call on executive 
functions (e.g., updating the record of conversation or, as just noted, inhibiting irrelevant or 
tangential turns) evidence regarding a relation is still sparse.  One comprehensive study of 
typical conversational development points to a role for both inhibition and working memory. 
Blain1Brière, Bouchard, and Bigras (2014) coded semi1structured conversations and found 
that  was negatively correlated with inhibition and  was positively 
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associated with working memory. In general, self1control, flexibility and planning showed 
very little association with pragmatic function. This confirms the general picture in this 
section whereby inhibition and working memory appear to be the most consistently important 
factors for pragmatic development.  
 "


  Succeeding on referential communication tasks in 
principle requires inhibiting one’s own perspective to consider the interlocutor’s and 
potentially switching back and forth between the two. In a particularly meticulous test of this 
hypothesis, Nilsen and Graham (2009) reported two studies assessing comprehension and 
production of referring expressions alongside tasks tapping working memory, inhibition and 
cognitive flexibility. In a first study, executive function was not associated with performance 
on a production task. However, there was a medium1sized correlation between egocentric 
errors on the comprehension task and inhibitory control (which withstood controlling for age 
and verbal ability).  Of particular interest was the fact that children’s performance on control 
trials (where the speaker could see all relevant objects and so inhibiting conflicting 
information about one’s own perspective to avoid egocentric responses was not required) was 
not correlated with any executive function measure. This provides a clear demonstration that 
inhibition is involved in preventing the selection of referents that, while plausible from the 
child’s point of view, are not from the speaker’s.  A second study found that better conflict 
inhibition specifically (i.e., inhibition where a specific response is suppressed while an 
alternative response is generated as opposed to delay inhibition where a response is 
suppressed for a given amount of time) was related to reduced egocentric looking during 
communicative perspective taking. Taken together, these studies provide a clear 
demonstration of the potential importance of inhibition in explaining why some children find 
communicative perspective taking easier than others.   
 One challenge with individual differences research is finding measures with sufficient 
Page 25 of 83
URL: http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/hlld  Email: lld@uchicago.edu
Language, Learning and Development
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
For Peer Review
 O
nly
INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES IN PRAGMATIC ABILITY 26
variance to test hypotheses. Nilsen and Graham, (2009) noted that their measure of cognitive 
flexibility was negatively skewed, which may have explained null findings. However, in a 
follow1up, Gillis and Nilsen (2014) found a large negative correlation between cognitive 
flexibility (sorting objects according to different dimensions) and 51year1olds’ rating of how 
helpful an ambiguous description was (a relationship that remained after controlling for age, 
receptive language and baseline ratings of unambiguous cues). No significant correlations 
were found for older children, illustrating how EF bottlenecks in language processing are 
likely to change over developmental time 
 Looking at production of unambiguous referring expressions and children’s ability to 
repair misunderstandings, Bacso and Nilsen (2017) found that cognitive flexibility and 
working memory (but not inhibition) were correlated with the quality of children’s 
descriptions even when expressive vocabulary was controlled. The authors suggest working 
memory may be called upon to identify which features best distinguish a target from 
distractors and/or to update a discourse model. Cognitive flexibility was also correlated with 
children’s ability to repair initially under1informative descriptions, which the authors suggest 
is because flexibility allows consideration of the referent from a different angle in order to 
generate new descriptions.  
 Overall, there is evidence that executive capacity explains variance on referential 
communication tasks although why specific relations hold and how these vary from 
comprehension to production tasks is not yet clear. Inhibition seems to be important for 
comprehension and future studies could establish if this is generally the case or whether this 
relation depends on the set up of referential communication tasks (where inhibiting a 
prepotent reach to respond is important). Future research might also assess whether working 
memory is less important in tasks that manipulate what is visually available (which is given 
at the time of testing and thus has a low memory demand) compared to what is available in 
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the discourse or in social common ground (which needs to be remembered from prior 
interaction – episodic memory 1 and updated as the discourse unfolds – working memory).  
 #. Narrative production requires organising a large amount of linguistic 
information and producing it in a given order such that a listener may be able to follow it. 
The need to manage common ground and update one’s model of what has been said over an 
extended period of time suggests an important role for executive functions. This may explain 
why children with SCD struggle to convey as much plot content as typically developing peers 
(often omitting initiating events and the story outcome). Ketelaars, Jansonius, Cuperus, and 
Verhoeven (2012) derived a composite EF measure (covering planning, inhibition, cognitive 
flexibility and working memory) and found that, once language ability was controlled for, EF 
was predictive of narrative productivity (i.e., length) in children with Pragmatic Language 
Impairment, explaining an additional 9% of variance (NB children with PLI – now referred to 
as SCD – were defined as those with a pragmatic composite below the cutoff score of 132 on 
the CCC). In contrast, no specific links with EF held for typically developing children once 
formal language ability was controlled for.  Narrative length is not a measure of pragmatic 
ability, however, so future research could clarify these findings.  
 With a large group of children with DLD and a group of typically developing 
children, Blom and Boerma (2016) measured narrative comprehension and production 
(macrostructure measure). For the DLD group, they found working memory was associated 
with concurrent narrative comprehension and production as well as production measured a 
year later. For the typically developing group, only concurrent narrative comprehension was 
significantly associated with working memory (although other correlations approached 
significance). This study also measure sustained attention and, while this was not included as 
an executive function in this review, it is worth noting that mediation analyses suggested an 
important role for sustained attention in story generation.  
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 Looking more specifically at referring expression production in narrative, Kuijper, 
Hartman and Hendriks (2015) found that working memory and inhibition were predictive of 
appropriate referent reintroduction (using a noun instead of a pronoun), although formal 
language ability was not controlled for.   
 	
. Just as irony comprehension should require mentalising skill, it should also 
require holding in mind different perspectives and potentially inhibiting one protagonist’s 
point of view in order to understand the other’s.  Filippova and Astington (2008) observed a 
medium correlation between working memory and the performance of typically developing 
children on irony comprehension tasks, although the degree to which it explained unique 
variance is unknown since it was used only as a control measure.  Godbee and Porter (2013) 
found a similar association for a typically developing group but no role for working memory 
in children and adults with Williams Syndrome (possibly due to floor effects).  Finally, 
Caillies, et al. (2014) measured working m mory and inhibitory control with multiple tasks 
and found a large correlation between inhibitory control and irony comprehension for 
typically developing children but surprisingly not for their ADHD group, although the 
authors note that the small sample size limits conclusions.  Overall, the picture is mixed but it 
would be worth exploring the role of inhibition and working memory further.  
'

 Of the three domains considered in this review, formal language was the one most 
consistently associated with pragmatic ability.  Once this had been controlled for, a number 
of studies found that a measure of mentalising explained further variance in pragmatic skills 
ranging from contingent conversation to irony comprehension. When no association with 
mentalising was observed, it was not clear whether this was because the specific type of 
mentalising measured was not required for the pragmatic task in question or whether 
collinearity with control variables could explain null findings. While there were fewer studies 
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on executive functions and these covered a broad range of skills, there was evidence that 
inhibitory control is associated with communicative perspective taking, and that working 
memory and generativity are important for some tasks.  Overall, however, few studies 
examining the relationship between pragmatics, on the one hand, and either mentalising or 
EF on the other, had: a) a sufficient sample size for correlational analyses; b) good quality 
measures yielding sufficient variance; c) a clear information processing rationale and d) 
controls for theoretically important covariates (e.g., formal language, non1verbal IQ).  
 Given the overall conclusion that all three domains are likely to be important for 
pragmatic function but in currently unspecified ways, we need to consider how future 
research would be best direct d. One obvious next step would be to unpack why the broad 
associations that are observed to hold do so for specific pragmatic functions (or not). To date, 
generic measures of pragmatic ability and associated variables have often been employed 
and, while these have been helpful for establishing global links and providing cognitive 
profiles for developmental disorders, these do not allow for mechanistic explanations of the 
psycholinguistic processes that constitute pragmatic language use or the developmental 
processes that explain pragmatic growth. Pinning down the specific associates of every 
possible pragmatic skill (and every candidate social and cognitive underpinning) individually 
is a quite an undertaking and has the potential of generating an uninterpretable mass of data. 
To make progress on this front, then, a number of things need to happen.  
 First, we need to empirically test potential taxonomies of pragmatics skills (e.g., as 
put forward by O’Neill, 2012). Factor analytic work in pragmatics is rare. Given the extreme 
diversity of abilities that make their way into pragmatic tests (Russel & Grizzle, 2008) it is 
important to get a better grip of the dimensional structure of this heterogeneous set of skills – 
and to consider stability over developmental time. Unfortunately, the same problem holds for 
the other social and cognitive domains reviewed. Ideally, then, we would consider a set of 
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these related domains in order to establish whether or not pragmatic skills can sensibly be 
thought of as a natural kind, separate from formal language skills and other aspects of 
cognition. Once we have an understanding of the dimensional structure of cognition and a 
clearly articulated taxonomy of pragmatic skills, systematically studying the development of 
different branches will be more manageable. 
 Second, we need to establish which pragmatic skills matter the most for everyday 
functioning and wellbeing.  Doing this will help direct research at those skills that will be 
most consequential.  For example, being able to maintain a conversation by responding to a 
partner is presumably very important for peer relations at every stage in development 
(Slomkowski & Dunn, 1996), whereas the ability to understand sarcasm might be less 
essential, especially for pre1adolescents. Ideally, we would be able to develop lab1based 
measures that are highly related to measures of everyday functioning and parent/teacher 
reports. While it has traditionally been held that lab tasks necessarily bleach out the very 
context1specific challenges that everyday conversation involves, there is recent work to 
suggest, for example, that parent reports of conversation skills (measured by the LUI) 
correlate with some carefully designed lab tasks (e.g., Abbot1Smith, Nurmsoo, Croll, 
Ferguson & Forrester, 2016). 
 Third, for each important pragmatic function, we need to aim for a mechanistic 
account of its use, taking an information processing approach to specif  which social and 
cognitive sub1processes are called upon and therefore may explain atypical development. For 
example, given an individual who has difficulties with discourse contingency, we need to 
establish whether this is because they have difficulty with, say, switching from their own 
topic of interest to that of a conversational partner, quickly accessing lexical and grammatical 
content, understanding the informational needs of the conversational partner, attending to the 
same things, generating new ideas in order to elaborate on the conversational partner’s 
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comment and/or integrating all of these things in time. Without clearly specifying expected 
sub1processes, studies run the risk of measuring social and cognitive associates that actually 
do not have that much in common with the kinds of things we expect a child would need to 
do for the given pragmatic task in question. This is particularly important given the task 
specificity of many cognitive1pragmatic associations found in the adult psycho1linguistic 
literature (e.g., Ryskin et al., 2015). 
 Fourth, once we have specific hypotheses about mechanisms, we need to develop 
tests of pragmatic and related skills that lend themselves to individual differences research 
(Cronbach, 1957; Hedge, Powell & Sumner, 2017). The availability of suitable measures was 
perhaps the most important limiting factor, alongside sample size, for studies in this review 
(see also Brown1Schmidt & Fraundorf, 2015 for similar conclusions in the adult literature). 
Many studies could not test for an association because one measure used was at floor or was 
otherwise problematic (sometimes because it was directly imported from experimental 
research and not ideal for correlational research). There are relatively few tests of individual 
differences in pragmatic skills available that have good psychometric properties in terms of 
reliability, validity and distributional properties.  Indeed, those that do exist tend to be very 
generic in nature, leaving us with the problem of identifying specific links. Some studies took 
the approach of having a large number of items on a test of a single skill that was well 
adapted to developmental level so as to yield the requisite variance (something that demands 
substantial piloting). A few studies used multiple measures and collapsed them onto one, for 
example, using principle components analysis. This has the advantage of removing task1
specific variance and avoiding running a large number of correlations (with the risk of type I 
errors). However, while in principle this could yield a specific measure, in practice it often 
resulted in a general measure (i.e., measurement quality often trades1off with specificity). 
While a global measure was the goal for the reported research, we will want more specific 
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measures in the future. Other work has employed scales, such as the one developed by 
Wellman and colleagues to measure ToM (Wellman & Liu, 2004). Often these have been 
shown to form Guttman scales so we know that children are likely to pass through steps on 
them in a given order. The assumption is that the individual skills on the scale are progressive 
expressions of, for example, a single underlying mentalising construct. Whether this 
assumption is valid for all scales and what relative success on them tells us about 
performance on a given pragmatic task is not always clear, however.  It could be that a single 
item on a scale taps an ability that is central to performance on a given pragmatic task and 
only this item is of relevance. Ideally, we would be able to analyse a given communicative 
task for the specific type of, say, mentalising we think is required and then test whether 
children who master this type of mentalising did well.  The inescapable fact is that it is very 
challenging indeed, particularly for cross1sectional studies, to find a set of measures (for the 
domains of interest plus controls) that tap specific constructs (avoiding problematic levels of 
incidental task demands) and yield sufficient variance.  
It would be particularly helpful to have non1verbal tests of covariates including 
mentalising. These are extremely difficult to develop for 2nd order false belief and more 
advanced forms of mentalising (see e.g., Freed et al., 2015). The most frequently used 
measures either require an advanced vocabulary (RMET, Baron1Cohen et al., 2001) or 
involve comprehension of vignettes of around 100 words each (e.g., Astington et al., 2002; 
Happé, 1994). The Animations task (Abel, Happé & Frith, 2000) does not burden language 
comprehension but participants are required to formulate descriptions of moving shapes that 
include mental state vocabulary. Film versions of Happé’s (1994) Strange Stories task, as 
developed by Devine and Hughes (2013), are an improvement but still require participants to 
formulate fairly complex responses and are still related to verbal ability. While less word1
heavy measures of 2nd order false belief exist (Grueneisen, Wyman & Tomasello, 2014), 
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these are time1consuming to administer and not easily scalable. Without such measures, it is 
possible that some associations are found between 2
nd
 order ToM and some pragmatic tests 
simply because they essentially measure the same verbal abilities.  
 The problem of cross1over of measures from one domain to another is quite 
frequently observed. Thus, the ability to understand jokes formed parts of a mentalising scale 
for at least one study reviewed here (Hale & Tager1Flusberg, 2005; see also Happé, 1994) 
whereas in another both jokes and irony were considered aspects of pragmatic language and 
were thus conflated in the analyses (Angeleri & Airenti, 2014). Similarly, the Mindful 
Conversational Difficulties scale used by de Rosnay et al. (2014) included items on the 
ability to understand others’ thoughts (i.e., mentalising). Elements of the CCC2 such as the 
scales on social relations and interests are included in measures of pragmatic ability for some 
studies. Similar measures of narrative (e.g., coherence) are sometimes considered pragmatic, 
sometimes not. Referential communication tasks are considered by some researchers to 
measure pragmatics (e.g., Nilsen & Graham, 2009) and by others to measure dynamic theory 
of mind (e.g., Begeer, Malle, Nieuwland & Keysar, 2010). Such blurring is inevitable for a 
field that has no clearly developed taxonomies or dimensional structure. 
 Fifth, assuming the above methodological challenges can be overcome, we will need 
to cast the net wider when considering the psychological variables that explain differences in 
pragmatic function. Some of the studies in the current review hinted at socio1emotional and 
personality traits that would be associated with pragmatics. We would also argue that lower 
level cognitive factors such as attentional biases and statistical learning (Bannard, Rosner & 
Matthews, 2017) are likely to be important. And at the other end of the spectrum, meta1
cognition would deserve attention, at least in so far as poor meta1cognition might prevent an 
individual from improving their pragmatic proficiency (e.g., Collins, Lockton & Adams, 
2014). To fully understand how these factors come to have their effects, it will be necessary 
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to determine their genetic and environmental bases (see Losh, et al, 2012a; Losh et al., 2012b 
for an example of work seeking to uncover genetic bases of social communication).  
 Sixth, we need to adopt statistical and modelling tools that will enable us to make 
best use of a dimensional approach to the study of pragmatic development. By a dimensional 
approach, we mean one where an individual child’s relative strengths and weaknesses are 
represented as a vector in multidimensional space. As mentioned above, through factor 
analysis, datasets with multiple measures from multiple children can help to give a sense of 
the dimensional structure of cognition. They can be used to derive clinical groups 1 children 
with particular clusters of strengths and weaknesses may be diagnosed with a given disorder 
in order to best target support. Datasets collected over longitudinal time can also be helpful in 
predicting outcomes (e.g., Pellicano, 2013).  However, to really explain pragmatic 
development, we would argue that individual differences data sets should also be used for 
building and testing mechanistic models of development.  
 One challenge to overcome with using individual differences data to build models is 
that the dimensions of interest rarely stand in isolation from another. When looking at higher1
order cognition, we assume this is because performance on tests of, say, pragmatics, 
mentalising and inhibition, all call on related sub1processes.  That is, different skills are often 
nested in others or are related in an interconnected hierarchy of cognitive functions.  Basic 
correlation and regression will not yield such a hierarchy or account for this nested structure 
and thus we are often left at a dead end. For example, if when predicting a general measure of 
pragmatic ability we control for vocabulary, grammar, IQ and some measure of executive 
function and we then fail to see an association with mentalising, is this because we do not 
take the other’s perspective during this task, is it because we do but everyone manages to do 
so equally, or is it because real variance in this ability was already accounted for by control 
measures that were each somewhat correlated with mentalising because they were drawing 
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on the same cognitive sub1processes?  This kind of problem seemed to be quite common in 
this review. And of course the better controlled the study, the more likely the problem is. To 
make progress we need to make sense of the collinearity we see, rather than simply analysing 
it away. That is, we could use multidimensional data sets to generate (and/or test theoretical 
proposals about) an underlying hierarchy of cognitive functions and thereby identify 
plausible cognitive sub1processes that are called upon to deploy a range of higher order 
functions. These sub1processes could in turn be verified by looking for their neural 
signatures. For this process to be rigorous and to avoid likely problems with publication bias, 
theory1driven analyses will ideally be preregistered. 
The argument being made here is not a reductionist one, but rather a call to integrate 
the results of modelling indiviudal differences data and complementary experimental work 
(which would appear on the basis of the current review to be essential) into psycholinguistic 
models of language processing. Pragmatic phenomena have often caused problems for the 
construction of language processing models. For example,  Hagoort and van Berkum (2007) 
review evidence that contextual information rapidly influences utterance interpretation 
(contra original assumptions that the language system first computes the meaning of an 
utterance and then engages in pragmatic processes). If we adopt Levinson’s (1983) Artificial 
Intelligence definition of pragmatics, where the contextual information that needs to be 
considered covers the entirety of interlocutors’ knowledge of the world, then it becomes clear 
why integrating pragmatic processes into models of language processing is very rarely 
attempted.  Allowing for individual differerences in model architecture only compounds the 
difficulty. We might therefore wonder whether it is naïve to aim for a full working model of 
language use (which necessitates a model of cognition generally) in the same way as we 
might have a model of, say, how the heart works. While we certainly need to be careful to 
articulate the level of explanation we are looking for (Rosenblueth & Wiener, 1945), 
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ultimately, a mechanistic model of language processing systems is the only satisfying 
explanation worth having.  Since we have seen how cognitive bottlenecks to pragmatic 
function are not persistent over development (e.g., Gillis & Nilsen, 2014), a valuable model 
will be one that changes over time. Certainly it seems worth directing research on pragmatics 
to explicitly aim for this goal.  
 In sum, there is considerable potential to make progress in understanding how we 
achieve the communicative feats we do, why some children struggle to achieve them, and 
what can be done to help those who face difficulties. The cultural differences in many aspects 
of pragmatic language (e.g., Filippova, 2014; Küntay, Nakamura & Ateş1Şen, 2014) mean 
that it will not always make s nse to say that someone is ‘good’ at pragmatics (nor to only 
seek to change children’s skills to the norm if they develop atypically). However, there is 
significant potential to help children for whom pragmatic difficulities impair wellbeing 
(Adams et al., 2014; Pickles et al., 2016).  Individual differences research has the potential to 
contribute to this progress but we need to overcome a few challenges in order to take a 
programmatic approach to the problem.  
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Web of Science, SCOPUS and PsycINFO were searched by the second author between 
February and March 2016.  Search terms were combined to cover the following domains: 1) 
pragmatics (pragmatic, social communication, audience design, common ground, 
conversation, discourse), 2) child development (child*, infan*, devel*, toddler, pre1school, 
preschool) and 3) the three underpinning cognitive domains (vocabulary, syntax, grammar, 
formal language, structural language; social cognition, social1cognition, theory of mind, false 
belief, joint attention, perspective taking, mental state, mentali*; executive function*, 
memory, cognitive flexibility, mental flexibility, set switching, inhibition, inhibitory control, 
executive control).  Any further papers identified from other sources (e.g., references section 
of initially identified papers) were included.  The third author expanded this search in July 
2016 to include the term irony as a pragmatic key word. Case studies or studies with small 
groups of brain damaged individuals or individuals with rare clinical disorders were excluded 
along with intervention studies and studies of bilingual children. Only papers that reported a 
measure of the strength of association between two continuous variables were included. 
Studies that reported group comparisons (e.g., incidence of pragmatic impairment associated 
with incidence of language impairment), while reflective of the same relationship, were not 
considered. A meta1analysis calculator was used to report effect sizes as Cohen’s d (Cohen, 
1992). We consider d=0.2 a ‘small’ effect size, 0.5 a ‘medium’ effect size and 0.8 a 
‘large’ effect size. For studies which presented data based on the same sample, a single effect 
size was calculated (Rosenthal, 1991). 
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Table 1: Study characteristics and findings. (Effect sizes reported in parentheses as Cohen’s d. Acronyms are spelt out at the end of the table.)  
 
Author (year) 
 
N, 
Population, 
Mean age 
(years; 
months) 
Pragmatic 
measure  
Executive 
function 
measure  
Mentalising 
measure  
Formal 
language 
measure  
Findings (effect size, Cohen’s d) 
Adachi et al., 
(2004) 
29, ADHD, 
9;6  
54, 
HFPDD, 
9;8  
Metaphor and 
Sarcasm 
Scenario Test 
(A written test 
that child need 
to be able to 
read)  
  Verbal IQ For children with ADHD, VIQ was correlated with 
metaphor (0.89) but not with sarcasm (0.15) or landmine
(10.10) scores.  
For HFPDD children, VIQ was correlated with metaphor
(1.24) but not with sarcasm (0.17) or landmine (0.04) 
scores 
Akbar, 
Loomis, and 
Paul (2013) 
62, ASD, 
8;7  
CASL Pragmatic 
Judgement 
Subtest 
 
WM – Letter 
number 
sequencing 
task of the 
WISC 
O – NEPSY1II 
animal sort 
subtest  
CF – D1KEFS 
trail making 
subtest  
I – D1KEFS 
 CELF 4 (Core 
Language 
standard score) 
 
CASL was correlated with CELF14 (2.35) 
 
CASL was correlated with WM (1.90) and O (0.92) but 
not with CF or I.  
 
CASL correlated positively with parent1report Vineland 
Communication Scale (1.17), teacher report Vineland 
Communication Scale (1.25), and negatively with 
teacher report WM (1.51)  
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colour1word 
interference 
subtest 
Parent1report 
and teacher1
report  1 
BRIEF 
Andrés1
Roqueta, 
Adrian, 
Clemente, and 
Katsos (2013) 
93, DLD, 
5;4 
  
ELI Pragmatics 
Subtest 
(Receptive and 
Expressive items 
related to 
figurative 
language, 
politeness  
(metacognitive) 
I – Matching 
Familiar 
Figures test  
 
Change of 
location task  
Unexpected 
contents task  
CEG (receptive 
grammar) 
Sentence recall 
(expressive 
grammar)  
ELI (receptive 
and expressive 
vocabulary) 
Pragmatic score correlated with ToM (1.28), Inhibition 
(1.31) grammar1receptive (1.58), grammar1expressive 
(0.89), vocabulary1receptive (1.28), vocabulary1
expressive (1.62)  
NB Items on ELI test vary in terms of whether they 
would traditionally be classified as pragmatic.  
Angeleri and 
Airenti, 2014; 
100, TD, 
4;9 
Irony 
comprehension 
and joke 
comprehension 
(combined for 
overall humour 
score) 
 1st and 2nd 
order ToM 
tasks 
Italian version 
of PPVT1R  
 
The overall humor score was significantly correlated 
with the ToM score (3#.3), with the PPVT1R score 
(2#8), and with children’s age (2#%.). Analyses looking 
at each type of pragmatic and ToM task, tended to reveal
correlations between ToM tasks and irony stories but no
correlations between ToM tasks and control stories.  
Path analyses suggested that language ability affected 
both humour comprehension and ToM, and ToM had no 
independent causal effect on humor comprehension.  
 
Bacso and 
Nilsen, 2017 
109, TD, 
5;0 
 
Referential 
communication 
task (production 
of unambiguous 
WM Digit 
Span subtest 
from the 
WISC4th 
 Picture Naming 
task from the 
WPPSI1III  
 
Looking at children’s initial descriptions of referents, the
number of descriptors they produced was correlated with
expressive vocabulary (0.77) working memory (0.85), 
and cognitive flexibility (0.70) but not inhibition.  
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descriptions) Edition  
I Red dog1 
Blue dog task 
CF Object 
classification 
task for 
children 
 Once age and vocabulary were partialled out, the 
correlation held with working memory (0.56) and 
working cognitive flexibility (0.43) 
 
Looking at children’s repairs of initially inadequate 
descriptions, the number of new descriptors they 
produced was correlated with expressive vocabulary 
(0.63) working memory (0.43), and cognitive flexibility 
(0.70) but not inhibition.  
Once age and vocabulary were partialled out, a 
correlation held for working cognitive flexibility (0.43)
 
Banasik, 2013 
 
46, TD, 5;1 Irony 
comprehension 
task (force 
choice touch 
screen task)  
 Reflection on 
thinking test: 9 
tasks including 
tests of:  
Appearance1
reality, 1st1 
and 2nd order 
belief,  
deception, 
emotion 
understanding 
 Recognition of irony did not correlate with children’s 
score on the ToM tests but did correlate with a measure 
of the quality of justification of their ToM responses 
(0.68) 
NB No age effect was found in group of 315 year olds.  
Bernard and 
Deleau (2007) 
81, TD,  
seen 
longitudinal
ly at  
3;8, 4;2  and 
4;8  
Communicative 
perspective 
taking measure 
(collapsing 
across three 
dimensions: 
1: social status, 
2: common 
ground 
 1
st
 order ToM 
(Unexpected 
transfer task  
Unexpected 
contents task  
Unexpected 
pictures task) 
 
 
Language score 
composite 
(Receptive 
vocab) and 
comprehension 
of relative 
clauses) derived 
from subtest 
from the 
At time 3;8: 
Communicative perspective taking was correlated with 
language ability (1.28), and false belief understanding 
(0.85). 
At 4;2: 
Communicative perspective taking was correlated with 
language ability (1.12), and false belief understanding 
(0.70). 
At 4;8 
Page 61 of 83
URL: http://mc.manuscriptcentral.com/hlld  Email: lld@uchicago.edu
Language, Learning and Development
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
For Peer Review Only
INDIVIDUAL DIFFERENCES IN PRAGMATIC ABILITY 62
3. Gricean 
maxims.) 
 
ISADYLE.  
 
Communicative perspective taking was correlated with 
language ability (0.85), and false belief understanding 
(0.47). 
 
Three regression analyses were run to explain variance 
in: CPT at time2 from measures taken at time1; CPT 
time 3 from measures at time 1 and CPT time 3 from 
measures at time 2.  
After controlling for age and CPT at the relevant prior 
time point, language scores predicted significant 
additional variance  (between 8 and 10%) but FB scores 
did not.   
 
Need to bear in mind that FB tasks at time 1 were 
nearing floor.  
  
Bishop and 
Norbury 
(2005) 
17, DLD, 61
10 
25, SCD, 61
10 
14, HFA, 61
10 
 
Principal 
component 
from: CCC 
(teacher/therapis
t report) 
pragmatic 
composite and 
communication 
scales of SCQ,  
ADOS1G  
Generativity  1 
Composite of 
two ideational 
fluency tasks 
(Use of 
Objects and 
Pattern 
Meanings) 
  Generativity was correlated with the pragmatic 
composite (0.93) 
 
Generativity was not correlated with  
SCQ communication scale but was correlated with the 
CCC pragmatic composite (0.45) and with the ADOS–G 
communication scale (1.11). Both the latter correlations 
remained the same size when age and language were 
partialled out.  
Blain1Brière, 
Bouchard and 
Bigras (2014) 
 
70, TD, 4;8  
 
Semi1structured 
conversation 
 
 
SC – 
Prohibited toy 
protocol  
WM – 
Backwards 
digit span  
  No relationship between EF and PSCS1P1complexity was
strong enough to reach significance (0.49) 
Talkativeness was negatively correlated with inhibition 
(10.58) 
Responsiveness was positively associated with working 
memory (0.61) 
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CF – DCCS  
P/I – Tower of 
Hanoi 
Fluidity (speech free of hesitation and repetition), was 
positively correlated with all EF measures except 
flexibility (Self1control: 0.63, Inhibition: 0.63, Working 
memory: 0.52, Planning: 0.65) 
Measures of self1control, flexibility and planning showed
very little association with pragmatic function other than
fluidity. 
Blom and 
Boerma 
(2016) 
84 DLD 5;9 
45 TD 5;9 
(with a 
follow up at 
6;9) 
Narrative 
production and 
comprehension 
(Macrostructure) 
1 Multilingual 
Assessment 
Instrument for 
Narratives 
(LITMUS1
MAIN) 
WM – 
Backwards 
digit span 
 PPVT III 
(Dutch Version) 
TAK sentence 
repetition task 
For the children with DLD, narrative comprehension was
associated with vocabulary at both time points (0.63), 
with sentence repetition at time 1 (0.75) and with 
working memory at time 1 (0.75).  
Narrative production was associated with sentence 
repetition at both time points (0.54) and with working 
memory at both time points ( 0.47, 0.82)  
 
For the TD children, narrative comprehension was 
associated with sentence repetition at time 1 (1.03) and 
with working memory at time 1 (0.82).  
 
Caillies et al. 
(2014) 
 
15 TD, 9;0 
15 ADHD 
9;0 
Irony 
comprehension 
WM Digit 
Span subtest 
from the 
WISCIV and 
Sentence 
Repetition 
subtest of the 
French version 
of the NEPSY 
I. Auditory 
Attention and 
Response Set, 
and Statue 
Two 2
nd
 order 
false belief 
tests 
Verbal 
reasoning 1 
Similarities 
subtest of the 
WISC1IV 
For children with ADHD, 2nd order false belief 
understanding related to both an ‘explanation’ question 
(What did [IRONIST] mean when s/he said X?) (1.42) 
and to a question about the ironist’s belief (1.85).   
Verbal reasoning was also correlated with both 
measures; irony explanation (1.91), ironist’s belief 
(2.27), and to an even greater degree than ToM (1.85).  
EF measures did not correlate with comprehension 
scores.  
 
For the typical group, ToM only related to the question 
about the ironists belief.  Verbal reasoning was not 
correlated with either measure. Inhibitory control was 
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from French 
version of the 
NEPSY 
 
 
correlated with both measures irony explanation (1.58), 
ironist’s belief (2.87), but working memory was not.  
 
Neither age nor verbal IQ was controlled for in these 
analyses. Authors note small sample size.  
Capps et al., 
(1998) 
15, ASD, 
11;11  
15, DD, 9;5  
Semi1structured 
conversation 
 1st order ToM 
(Smarties task  
Sally1Anne 
task)  
 
CELF (language 
age) 
For the ASD group, the amount of contingent, relevant 
and new information they provided was correlated with 
ToM scores (1.5). However, when language age was 
accounted for, the association with ToM was no longer 
significant.  
For the developmentally delayed control group, language
age was correlated with contingent, relevant, new info, 
(2.14) but ToM was not.  
Capps, Losh 
and Thurber, 
(2000) 
13, ASD, 
12.6 
13, DD, 9.8 
13, TD, 6.0 
Narratives 
elicited using 
wordless picture 
book 
 1st order ToM 
(Smarties task, 
puppet and 
interactive 
versions of the 
Sally1Ann  
task) 
CELF language 
age 
For the ASD group, scores of ToM tasks were correlated
with the following narrative qualities: syntactic diversity
(2.41), evaluative statements (1.35), evaluative diversity 
(1.85), mental state terms (2.49) and negatively 
correlated with affective state terms (12.49).  
Theory of mind continued to be marginally correlated 
with the mental state terms (1.28), and affective state 
terms, (11.25) when language ability was controlled for. 
For the developmentally delayed group, there were no 
significant correlations between scores of ToM tasks and
narrative qualities.  
Dahlgren and 
Dahlgren 
Sandberg 
(2008" 
30, ASD, 
10;1   
30, TD, 9;6  
Referential 
communication 
task  (describing 
cards that 
listener could 
not see) 
 
 
 1t order ToM  
(ToM1)  
2nd order ToM 
(ToM2)  
 
Verbal IQ  For children with ASD, verbal IQ was related to the 
number of relevant features mentioned and referential 
efficiency in a sample of 30 71 to 141year1olds with ASD
 
For children with ASD, ToM1 was correlated with both 
the number of relevant features mentioned when 
describing a target (1.10) and the efficiency with which 
these (and not irrelevant features) were mentioned (1.08)
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However, these measures were also associated with 
verbal IQ so the specificity of association is unclear. 
N.B., ToM1 was a binary measure (pass / fail), only five 
of the thirty children with ASD failed 1st1order ToM.  
No associations with 2
nd
 order ToM were observed for 
TD children or those with ASD (possibly due to lack of 
variance).   
Davies, 
Andrés1
Roqueta, and 
Norbury 
(2016) 
18, DLD, 51
10;11  
18, TD, 51
10;11  
Reference 
production task  
Comprehension 
and judgement 
task (describing 
referents a 
listener cannot 
see and selecting 
referents based 
on visual and 
discourse 
context)  
  Receptive and 
expressive 
grammar 
(sentence recall) 
subtests from 
the ELI.  
Vocabulary 
subtest from the 
WISC1IV  
Across both groups there were significant correlations 
between production of optimal utterances in the contrast 
condition and all formal language measures (combined 
effect size 0.93)  
Across both groups, performance on the judgement task 
significantly correlated with receptive grammar and 
vocabulary (combined effect size 2.27)  
Correlations are also reported by group 
For children with DLD, there were correlations between 
production of optimal utterances on a referential 
communication task and receptive grammar: (1.49) and 
vocabulary (1.01) but not sentence recall (10.12) 
For TD children there was an association with receptive 
grammar only (2.49) 
 
De Marchena 
and Eigsti, 
2016 
 
18, ASD, 
12;7116;11 
18, TD, 
12;2117;11 
Narrative task – 
private condition 
and shared 
condition 
yielding an 
adaptation to 
common ground 
measure.  
  PPVT Receptive vocabulary was not found to correlate with the
common ground measure, within or across groups. 
NB Authors note that participants were selected to be in 
normal range for vocabulary.  
When the groups were collapsed, scores on the Social 
Responsiveness Scale (SRS) were negatively correlated 
with the common ground measure.  
De Rosnay, 
Fink, Begeer, 
129, TD, 
6;6  
Mindful 
Conversation 
 Ten1item ToM 
battery 
PPVT1III 
 
PPVT1III and MCC were significantly correlated (0.63)
Total ToM was significantly correlated with MCC (0.85)
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Slaughter, and 
Peterson 
(2014) 
Competence  consisting of 
standard false1
belief tasks  
and this relationship remained after age and PPVT1III 
and shyness were controlled for (0.54)  
NB Some questions on the MCC are directly tap ToM 
(e.g., ‘Does the child have difficulty understanding other
peoples thoughts?’). 
Farrant, 
Maybery, and 
Fletcher 
(2010) 
Study 1: 99, 
TD, 5;4 
Study 2:  
 93 TD 5;1 
and 30 DLD 
5;3   
Conversation 
Skill Rating 
Scale 
 
 
 Socio1
emotional 
engagement, 
joint attention 
and imitation 
were measured 
retrospectively 
using scales 
developed for 
this project  
 Study 1 – CSRS was significantly related to socio1
emotional engagement (0.93), joint attention (1.42) and 
imitation (0.95) 
Study 2 – CSRS was significantly correlated with socio
emotional engagement (0.70), joint attention (0.80) and 
imitation (0.95). 
NB Reliability of retrospective reports is unclear.  
 
Fernández  
(2013) 
115, TD, 
4;81 8;8  
Narrative 
production 
coded for 
evaluation, 
accurate 
cohesion, 
psychological 
cohesion and 
coherence (plus 
combined 
pragmatic score)  
 ToM1  
ToM2  
Messy room 
story  
Faux pas story  
 
Spanish 
adaptation of 
the PPVT1R  
Pragmatic language scores were correlated with number 
of utterances (0.89) and number of clauses (1.62) 
TVIP scores were only significantly correlated with 
narrative coherence (0.54) 
There was no correlation between any of four measures 
of narrative quality and 1
st
 order ToM scores (perhaps 
due to a ceiling effect on the latter)  
There was a correlation with 2
nd
 order ToM and 
coherence scores (0.47) 
A regression model predicting overall pragmatic score 
found, after entering gender and length of narrative, 2nd 
order ToM explained an additional 5% of variance 
Filippova and 
Astington 
(2008)  
 
24, TD, 5;8  
24, TD, 7;7  
24, TD, 9;7  
Irony 
comprehension  
 
WM – 
Numbers 
subtest of the 
children’s 
memory scale 
Combined: 
2nd order false 
belief stories,  
Strange 
stories,  
Receptive 
vocabulary 
PPVT1III  
 
Irony was significantly positively correlated with 2
nd
 
order ToM (1.19), PPVT1III (1.42), WM (0.63) and 
prosodic understanding (0.75). 
Once age, vocabulary, and digit1span were controlled 
for, a marginally significant association between ToM 
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 Faux pas 
stories   
and Irony scores remained (0.45) 
Regression models showed that once age, memory, 
attunement to prosody and receptive vocabulary were 
controlled for, ToM was a significant predictor of irony 
comprehension  
When all other variables are controlled for, vocabulary 
also explained unique variance  
Fukumura 
(2016) 
20, ASD, 
8;10 
20, TD, 8;4 
(plus 
additional 
study with 
adolescents) 
Referential 
communication 
task 
  BPVS; 
Expressive 
vocabulary sub1
test of the 
WASI 
For both the ASD group, neither receptive nor expressive
vocabulary was correlated with the tendency to use more
adjectives in the shared rather than privileged context, or
with the number of egocentric adjectives in the 
privileged context.  
There were large correlations between the number of 
adjectives produced in the shared context and both 
receptive  2#!" and expressive  K3#;." vocabulary.  
 
In the TD group, adjective use was not correlated with 
either vocabulary measure.   
Gillespie1
Lynch et al., 
(2015) 
23, TD, 31 
TD sibs at 
high risk 
ASD, 10 
high risk 
sibs who 
went on to 
have ASD, 
7;5 
CCC12 
Pragmatic 
composite 
(parent report) 
 
  ESCS  Groups analysed separately. No association between 
joint attention variables at 12 months or 18 months and 
school age pragmatic language for children with ASD or
for TD children (collected approximately 6 years later) 
NB Behaviours observed during infancy occurred with a 
low frequency.  
 
Gillis and 
Nilsen (2014) 
 
40, TD 5;0  
36, TD, 7;1  
Referential 
communication 
– Ambiguity 
detection task  
 
CF – Object 
classification 
task for 
children  
 
 Picture 
vocabulary 
subtest of the 
TOLD 
Significant negative correlation between scores on the 
CF task and ratings of how helpful the ambiguous clues 
were for 51year1olds (11.15, i.e, the better the CF, the 
more likely they were to say ambiguity was unhelpful). 
This  
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relationship remained after controlling for age and 
receptive language. No significant correlations were 
found for 71year1olds. 
Significant negative correlation between TOLD (formal 
language) and ambiguity detection for both groups (5  
years 10.77; 7 years –0.72). 
Godbee and 
Porter (2013) 
 
26, WS, 
18;3 
26, TDCA 
(Chronologi
cal Age 
matched) 
18;0,  
26, TDMA 
(Mental 
Age 
matched), 
5;9 
Non1literal 
speech stories 
(sarcasm, 
metaphor, simile 
comprehension) 
Verbal 
working 
memory (WJ 
Revised)  
 Expressive 
vocabulary (WJ 
Revised)  
For TDCA and TDMA controls combined, each of the 
cognitive measures assessed using the WJ1R COG 
(including expressive vocabulary, verbal working 
memory, perceptual integration, inferential reasoning and
overall cognitive ability) was significantly and positively
correlated with each of the measures of non1literal 
language comprehension (no individual results reported 
by all effect sizes d >1.39).  
For the WS group, measures of sarcasm comprehension 
were not correlated with any cognitive measures. 
Metaphor comprehension was correlated with verbal 
working memory (0.84) but not expressive vocabulary. 
Simile comprehension was correlated with verbal 
working memory (0.88) but not expressive vocabulary. 
NB small sample size and large age range (early 
childhood to late adulthood) 
Hale and 
Tager1
Flusberg 
(2005) 
57, ASD, 41
13;11  
Natural language 
with parent 
during free play 
coded for topic 
contingent 
discourse  
 Ten1item ToM 
battery in 3 
sequenced 
batteries 
covering: 
Desire and a 
pretense, 
Combined: 
Receptive 
vocabulary 
PPVT1III and 
Expressive 
Vocabulary test 
Time 1 – significant correlation between contingent 
discourse and vocab (0.87) and ToM (1.12).  
 
Time 2 – significant correlation between contingent 
discourse and vocab (0.95) and ToM (1.31) 
 
At both time points, regression analysis confirmed that 
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perception/kno
wledge, 1
st
 and 
2
nd
 order false 
belief, lies 
jokes, moral 
judgement.   
ToM explained additional variance (8%) once age, IQ 
and vocab score were controlled for.  
 
Time 1 vocabulary was the only significant longitudinal 
predictor of time 2 contingent discourse.  
 
Huang, Oi and 
Taguchi 
(2015)  
 
50, 
HFASD, 
10;2 
50, TD, 
10;7 
40 figurative 
language tasks 
(comprehension 
of metaphor, 
irony, sarcasm, 
indirect reproach 
and indirect 
request)  
 ToM Battery – 
1
st
 and 2
nd
 
order ToM  
PPVT1R, Verbal 
IQ (WISC III)  
For TD children, receptive vocabulary was correlated 
with metaphor comprehension (0.62) but not with any 
other measures of figurative language.   
For HFASD children, receptive vocabulary was 
significantly correlated with metaphor comprehension 
(1.13) as was verbal IQ.  No correlations with other 
measures of figurative language were observed.  
No correlations with ToM measures were reported 
(instead children were classified into one of 3 groups for
this measure) 
Ketelaars, 
Jansonius, 
Cuperus, and 
Verhoeven 
(2012) 
77, SCD, 
5;6  
77, TD, 5;6  
 
  
Dutch adaptation 
of the Renfrew 
bus story test. 
Narratives coded 
for: productivity 
(length), 
organization 
(relevant 
content), and 
cohesion (use of 
cohesive 
devices)  
 
 
  
Principal 
component of: 
Planning, 
inhibition, 
cognitive 
flexibility 
(Tower task 
Auditory 
attention and 
response set 
from NEPSY) 
and working 
memory 
(number recall 
from Kaufman 
Assessment 
1st order ToM: 
Three change 
of location 
tasks  
Composite of: 
Receptive and 
sentence 
comprehension 
(from Dutch 
Language test 
for children)  
Expressive 
vocabulary 
(from Dutch 
Renfrew Word 
Finding 
Vocabulary 
Test) 
For TD children, narrative productivity (but not content 
or cohesion) was positively correlated with EF (0.63) and
ToM (0.85).  Once language was controlled for, only 
ToM was predictive of narrative productivity.  
 
For SCD children (who tended to convey less plot 
content, often omitting initiating events and the story 
outcome) EF was correlated with narrative productivity 
(0.79) and organisation (0.45).  
Once language was controlled for, EF was predictive of 
SCD children’s narrative productivity (explaining an 
additional 9% of variance)  
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Battery for 
Children) 
Kuijper, 
Hartman and 
Hendriks 
(2015) 
46, ASD 
37, ADHD  
38, TD 
 
Narrative 
production: 
Referent 
maintenance and 
to reintroduction 
I – stop signal 
task 
WM – n1back 
task 
1
st
 and 2
nd
 
order ToM 
Vocabulary 
from Dutch 
WISC1III 
and Dutch 
PPVT1III (not 
analysed) 
None of the cognitive predictors explained variance in 
the rate at which children appropriately maintained 
referenced.  
In a series of mixed effects logistic regression models, a
cognitive variables analysed (1
st
 and 2
nd
 order ToM, WM
and I) were found to be associated with appropriate 
referent reintroduction.  
In a multivariate model with all four cognitive predictors
considered simultaneously (fitted to data from all three 
groups), reintroduction was predicted by 2
nd
 order ToM 
and working memory.  
Note, formal language was not controlled in these 
analyses.  
Leonard et al 
(2011) 
54,  
TD, 10;6  
CCC12 
composite of 
scales E1J 
(parent ratings) 
 
 
  OWLS. 
Combined Oral 
Expression and 
Listening 
Comprehension.  
 
Verbal IQ  
(KBIT12) 
No correlations between CCC2 and either OWLS or 
verbal IQ. 
NB This study includes CCC2 subscales I and J, which 
cover social relations and interests (i.e., non pragmatic 
features of autism). Not clear whether a correlation 
would be expected.  
 
 
Losh and 
Capps (2003) 
28, high1
functioning 
ASD, 11.3  
22, TD, 
10.6  
Semi1structured 
conversational 
storytelling,  
storybook 
narratives 
(coded for 
length, 
 Happé’s 
strange stories  
Verbal IQ 
(WISC1III) 
Narrative measures were not correlated with Verbal IQ 
or ToM, although associations with emotion 
understanding were observed.  
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grammatical 
complexity, 
evaluation and 
structure)  
Losh, Martin, 
Klusek, 
Hogan1
Brown, and 
Sideris (2012) 
28, ASD, 
9;2,  
40 FXS1 
ASD, 10;7 
21, FXS 
only, 9;7 
21, DS, 
10;10  
20, TD, 
4;10 
(All groups 
male)  
Pragmatic 
Judgement 
subtest of CASL  
CCC12 (teacher 
ratings) 
 
 
 
 Basic battery: 
intentionality, 
understanding 
of desires, 
false belief 
(reduced 
verbal load), 
appearance1
reality and 
perspective 
taking.  
Advanced 
battery: 
perspective 
taking, div rse 
desires, 
diverse belief, 
false belief and 
knowledge 
access 
 Correlations between ToM and performance on the 
CASL for ASD (1.35), FXS (0.77), DS (1.19) and TD 
(1.28)  
Correlations between ToM and scores on the CCC12 
initiation subscale for ASD (1.35) and coherence 
subscale for FXS (0.77).  
 
 
Maridaki1
Kassotaki, and 
Antonopoulou 
(2011) 
76, TD, 5;6  Listening Skills 
Test.  
Test of 
Referential 
Communication 
 Composite of: 
Unexpected 
transfer test  
Deceptive box 
test  
Deceptive 
object test  
 
 False belief was correlated with two out of four 
components of the LIST: referent identification (0.47) 
and comprehension of directions (0.61) 
It was also correlated with one out of the three 
components of the TREC: the ability to detect ambiguity
in oral messages and respond adequately as listener 
(0.66).  It did not correlate with the component ‘adequate
message to speaker’.   
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NB Many items on this LIST could be classified as 
calling on semantic knowledge whereas the TREC 
requires children to unambiguously describe a target in 
an array of distractors (and to do the receptive 
equivalent) 
 
Massaro et al., 
(2014) 
34, TD, 5;8  
36, TD, 7;3  
 
Irony 
comprehension: 
socially shared 
(SS) irony and 
situationally 
defined (SD) 
irony  
 
  
 1st order 
(unexpected 
transfer) and 
2nd order FB 
tasks 
ToM 
Metacognitive 
vocabulary test;  
Italian 
standardisation 
of PPVT1R  
Collapsing across age groups and partialling out age, 
there was a significant correlation between both irony 
tasks and both vocabulary tasks and some correlation 
with FB1: 
SS irony: correlated with PPVT (0.56); and MVT (0.47) 
and FB1 (0.54) 
SD irony: correlated with PPVT (0.74); and MVT (0.51)
 
Regression analyses by age revealed nothing was 
predictive of 5 year olds’ comprehension. For 7 year 
olds, only vocabulary was a predictor of SS irony.  
Vocabulary and MVT were predictors of SD irony.  
NB: Only one item tapping 2
nd
 order ToM – lack of 
variance could explain some null findings.  
 
McEvoy, 
Rogers, and 
Pennington 
(1993) 
17, ASD, 
5;1  
13, DD, 4;2  
16, TD, 3;2  
ESCS: Joint 
Attention, Social 
Interaction and 
Behaviour 
regulation 
scales.  
 
  
I – AB error 
task  
I – Delayed 
response task  
CF – Spatial 
reversal task-
CF – 
Alternation 
task   
 Verbal tasks 
from the BSID 
Picture naming 
and 
identification 
and verbal tasks 
from the 
Stanford1Binet 
Intelligence 
Scale  
Correlation analyses run for three groups combined for 
children contributing data to the spatial reversal task 
(focused on because most sensitive to group differences
Perseverative errors on the spatial reversal task were 
correlated with the Joint Attention scale of ESCS and (1
1.25) and the Social interaction scale (10.98) 
 
Verbal ability was correlated with the Social interaction 
scale (10.82) 
  
Regression analysis controlling for group membership 
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and verbal ability revealed that joint attention was a 
significant predictor of spatial reversal.  
 
NB The ESCS largely assesses non1verbal 
communication and some scales could equally be 
categorised as a measure of mentalising. 
 
Mewhort1
Buist and 
Nilsen, 2013 
 
88, TD, 
9;10 
Irony 
comprehension 
(understanding 
speaker belief 
and intent for 
criticism and 
compliments) 
 2nd order false 
belief task 
Picture 
Vocabulary 
subtest of the 
TOLD1I:4 
When a speaker made an ironic criticism, receptive 
vocabulary skills were correlated with understanding the
speaker’s belief  (0.37) and their intent (0.68).  ToM 
skills were not correlated with understanding (although 
the measure of understanding speaker belief was almost 
at ceiling). 
When a speaker made an ironic compliment, vocabulary 
skills were significantly associated with understanding 
the speaker’s belief  (0.37) but not their intent. ToM was
correlated with understanding the speaker’s belief (.36)
but not their intent.  
NB Large number of measures correlated, with some 
towards ceiling.  
Miniscalco, 
Rudling, 
Rastam, 
Gillberg, and 
Johnels (2014) 
34, ASD, 
3;5  
and 4;6 
Swedish version 
of CDI:WS 
 
Pragmatics scale 
from Swedish 
CDI:WS 
  CDI words and 
gestures (CDI: 
WG)  
CDI:WS 
Partial correlations (accounting for age): 
Pragmatics scales at time 1 and 2 were significantly 
positively correlated with vocabulary (time 1 (1.76); time
2 (1.25)) and grammar (time 1 (2.20); time 2 (1.07)).  
 
In a regression analysis predicting time 2 pragmatic 
score, with age, time elapsed since time 1 and time 1 
pragmatic score as control, vocab and grammar did not 
predict pragmatic language outcomes (but the ‘imitating 
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adults score did).  
 
NB The pragmatic scale assessed whether children use 
language to talk about the past or future and whether 
they engage in pretend play. 
Nadig, 
Vivanti and 
Ozonoff 
(2009) 
17, HFA, 
11;3 
17, TD, 
10;8 
Referential 
communication 
tasks  
  CELF 4 Level 1 adaptation (when both speaker and addresses can
see all the objects, providing sufficient disambiguating 
information to select one) was correlated with formal 
language level for the TD group (1.07) but not the HFA 
group.  
Level 2 adaptation (when an addressee cannot see all the
objects, only using descriptions that make sense from 
their point of view) was not correlated with language 
level for the TD group but it was for the HFA group 
(0.85). 
 
Level 3 adaptation (efficiently providing indirect clues to
hidden object identity) was correlated with language 
level for both the TD (marginally significant correlation)
and the HFA group. 
Nicholson et 
al., 2013) 
 
31, TD, 9;2 Comprehension 
of ironic 
criticisms (overt 
forced choice 
response and eye 
movement 
measures) 
CCC12 
 Empathy 
Quotient (EQ1
C) 
CCC12 
(subscales A1D) 
No measure of irony comprehension was correlated with
the CCC2 structural language or pragmatic subscales.  
The structural language subscales of the CCC2 were 
correlated with the pragmatic subscales (1.67) 
Comprehension choice scores were correlated with 
empathy quotient (0.95) and some eye1movement 
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(subscales E1H) measures.  
NB large number of measures correlated in analyses.  
Nilsen and 
Graham, 
(2012) 
 
  
34, TD, 4;1  
(then 
longitudinal
ly followed 
to 4;6 and 
5;0) 
Referential 
communication 
– Task assessing 
object choice, 
looking time, 
and message 
evaluation.   
 
 
 
I – Day1night  
I – Grass1snow  
 
 PPVT III  Inhibition was not related to looking time or object 
choice.  
Inhibition was not related to message evaluations within 
the same assessment period  
For the knowledgeable1ambiguous condition,  
inhibition at 4 years was correlated message evaluation 
both at 4;6 (1.35) and 5;0 (0.95) when verbal skills were 
controlled for.  
Inhibition was not correlated with performance in any of
the other conditions 
 
Vocabulary skills were not significantly related to 
message evaluations at any age 
Nilsen and 
Graham, 
(2009) – 
experiment 
one  
60, TD, 5;0  Referential 
communication 
task with objects 
in/outside visual 
common ground. 
Production and 
comprehension 
(object choice 
and looking 
time) measures  
 
 
  
WM – 
Backwards 
digit span  
WM – 
Memory for 
objects taken 
from WISC1III  
I – Red 
dog/blue dog  
I – Tapping 
task  
CF – Flexible 
item selection  
 PPVT III  
 
The production measure was only correlated with 
memory for objects (0.61) and this did not hold when age
and verbal skills were controlled for. 
 
All three measures of comprehension (of egocentric 
interpretation) were significantly negatively correlated 
with performance on inhibition tasks but not other 
measures of EF (Red/blue dog; 10.65, Tapping task; 1
0.52). After controlling for age and verbal skills, 
correlations remained between red/blue dog task and 
both looking time and choice of referential alternative (
0.52) and between the tapping task and looking time.  
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PPVT was correlated with how often two objects were 
chosen in privileged ground condition (10.54) 
Nilsen and 
Graham 
(2009) – 
experiment 
two  
47, TD, 
3;10  
Referential 
communication 
task with objects 
in/outside visual 
common ground. 
Comprehension 
measures of 
egocentrism 
(object choice 
and looking time 
measures)  
 
I – 
Bear/dragon 
task  (conflict 
inhibition) 
I – Gift delay 
task (delay 
inhibition) 
 
 PPVT PPVT was correlated with how often a referential 
alternative was picked in privileged ground condition  .
.77 but not other measures of egocentric comprehension 
(although association was in same direction).  
 
The bear/dragon task was correlated with duration of 
egocentric eye gaze (10.98) and remained so when verbal
skills and age were controlled for. It was not correlated 
with the object choice measures of comprehension.   
The gift delay task was significantly correlated with the 
choice comprehension measures (10.71), however only 
the relationship between gift delay and both objects 
chosen remained significant when age and verbal skills 
were controlled for (10.68). There was no correlation 
between the gift delay task and duration of eye gaze  
In a regression model, children’s performance on the 
conflict inhibition task was the only variable that 
accounted for unique variance in the looking time 
measure (18%). 
 
Nilsen, 
Glenwright 
and Huyder 
(2011) 
 
53, TD, 8;8 Irony 
comprehension – 
forced choice 
measure 
 2nd order false 
belief tasks 
Picture 
Vocabulary 
subtest of the 
TOLD1Primary 
3 
In this task children heard a story about two protagonists
a speaker who made a sarcastic remark, and a listener 
who was either in a position to understand it was 
sarcastic or not. A measure of children’s sensitivity to 
the listener’s knowledge state affecting their 
understanding of the speaker’s intentions was 
significantly correlated with 2nd order ToM (0.70) but 
not with their understanding of the listener’s 
interpretation of humorous intent.  Receptive vocabulary
was not correlated with either measure although it was 
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correlated with a measure of understanding what the 
listener would believe to be the true state of affairs 
(0.56).  
 
Norbury, 
Gemmel, and 
Paul (2014)  
22, DLD, 
6;7 – 15;4 
26, ASD, 
6;6 – 15;9 
27, TD, 
6;9 – 15;2 
Narrative 
elicitation task, 
wordless picture 
book coded for 
internal state 
language, 
relevant content, 
pragmatic errors, 
and 
macrostructure 
  CELF14, Verbal 
IQ (WISC or 
BPVS) 
 
In the DLD group, language ability was not correlated 
with pragmatic errors.  
In the ASD group language ability was negatively 
correlated with pragmatic errors (1.22) However, it was 
also negatively correlated with relevant propositions (1
1.35), suggesting more verbally able children may be 
more verbose but not in an adaptive way.  
 
O’Reilly, 
Peterson and 
Wellman 
(2014) 
10, native 
signing 
deaf, 9;0,  
32, deaf of 
hearing 
parents (late 
signers), 9;3 
39 hearing 
children, 
8;8 
 
Comprehension 
of sarcasm 
 1st and 2nd 
order false 
belief 
Syntax subtest 
of CELF1 
Preschool 
translated into 
Auslan or NSS 
(no test 
administered for 
hearing 
children) 
For all children combined, the ToM measure was 
correlated with sarcasm measure (1.12) 
For the deaf children only, this correlation was re1run 
partialling out age and language ability and an 
correlation between ToM and sarcasm comprehension 
remained (.90) 
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Pellicano 
(2013) 
37, ASD, 
6;7 at time 
1, follow up 
3 years later 
(time 2) 
 
 
ADOS1G 
(higher scores 
reflect greater 
difficulty with 
social 
communication) 
Aggregate of: 
P – Tower of 
London task  
CF – Teddy1
bear set1
shifting task  
IC – Luria’s 
hand1game  
P – Mazes task 
from the 
Wechsler 
Preschool and 
Primary Scales 
of Intelligence 
–Revised  
Sum of: 1st1
order 
unexpected 
contents task,  
1st1order 
unexpected 
location task,  
2nd order 
unexpected 
location task  
 
PPVT1III Individual differences in children’s verbal ability (10.77)
ToM (10.79) and EF (11.15) scores at time 1 were 
significantly and negatively related to ADOS1G scores at
time 2 (whereas time 1 age, non1verbal ability and 
central coherence bore no such relation). 
When age, verbal ability, and non1verbal ability at time 1
were partialled out, only early differences in EF scores 
remained related to later ADOS1G scores (0.21) 
In a regression analysis, only EF (not ToM or Central 
Coherence) predicted unique variance (16%) above and 
beyond age verbal and non1verbal ability.  
 
Pesco and 
O’Neill 
(2012) 
348 
children 
between 18 
and 47 
months 
when LUI 
collected 
and mean 
age 5;8 
when 
language 
outcomes 
collected.  
Oversampli
ng to ensure 
representati
on of 
LUI parent 
completed 
(language total 
score) 
  DELV1NR 
(total language 
composite 
score), The 
CELF1P2 (core 
language score); 
CCC2 (language 
composite) 
For children with LUI total score collected between 12 
and 24 months (N= 112), there was a correlation with the
DELV1NR language composite at 5;8  (0.4) but not with 
the other two language measures.   
For children with LUI total score collected between 24 
and 29 months (N= 94), there was a correlation with all 
three language outcome measures at 5;8 ( d between .6 
and .73) 
For children with LUI total score collected between 30 
and 35 months (N= 67), there was a correlation with all 
three language outcome measures at 5;8 (average d = 
1.21) 
For children with LUI total score collected between 36 
and 41 months (N= 32), there was a correlation with all 
three language outcome measures at 5;8 ( d between .79 
and 1.4). 
For children with LUI total score collected between 42 
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children 
with weak 
pragmatic 
skills on 
LUI 
and 47 months (N= 43), there was a correlation with all 
three language outcome measures at 5;8 ( d between .35 
and .67) 
Thus the LUIs predictive validity changed with age and 
peaked approximately when children turn 3 years of age.
Pexman et al. 
(2009) 
118 older 
TD, 9;9, 
and 118 
younger  
TD 6;9 
Production of 
irony during 
naturalistic play 
with two other 
family members 
   PPVT No correlations observed between receptive vocabulary 
and irony production.  
NB broad definition of irony used.  
Resches and 
Pereira (2007) 
74, TD, 4;6 Referential 
communication 
task – treasure 
hunt where 
director child 
helps another 
who was not 
previously party 
to information 
about location of 
treasure 
 ToM – 2 tasks 
assessing 
knowledge1
ignorance and 
1st order false 
belief 
 ToM was correlated with the number of accurate 
descriptions children produced (1.96), an association 
that remained once age was controlled for (0.87).  
ToM was also negatively correlated with the number of 
ambiguous descriptions produced (11.58) but once age 
was controlled for this association did not hold.  
 
NB pragmatic ability was a property of dyads, large 
number of correlations run.  
Rinaldi, 
Baruffaldi, 
Burdo, and 
Caselli (2013)  
23, deaf, 
1;713;0 
(correlation
s N = 11) 
Italian version of 
the Social 
Conversational 
Skills Rating 
Scale. Parent 
report with 
assertiveness 
  Short form of 
the Italian 
version of the 
MacArthur1
Bates CDI 
Words and 
Sentences 
Significant correlation between word production and the 
pragmatic subscales assertiveness (1.67) and 
responsiveness (2.02)  
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and 
responsiveness 
scales 
(expressive 
vocabulary 
analysed) 
Rints, 
McAuley, and 
Nilsen (2015) 
36, TD, 3;7 CASL – 
Pragmatic 
Judgement 
subtest  
LUI (part 3) 
I – Statue 
subtest of the 
NEPSY1II  
 
SWAN parent 
rating scale: 
total scores 
reflecting 
inattention and 
hyperactivity1
impulsivity 
  Controlling for age, children who made more movement 
errors on the Statue task also obtained lower scores on 
the CASL (11.12) 
Children who were rated as more inattentive or 
hyperactive1impulsive by their parents were also rated as
having poorer pragmatic skills on the LUI (.80) 
Slomkowski 
and Dunn 
(1996) 
36 TD (3;4 
for ToM 
assessment 
3;11 for 
communicat
ion) 
Naturalistic 
conversation 
with a peer 
coded for 
connectedness 
 1st order ToM 
(change of 
location tasks) 
 False belief scores were correlated with mean length of 
connected episode (.84), mean length of play episode 
(.93) and mean length of pretend episode (.70) 
Tager1
Flusberg and 
Sullivan 
(1995) 
27, ASD, 
16;8 
27 DD, 
12;6 
 
Narrative 
production based 
on wordless 
picture book 
 
 1st order ToM 
(4 false belief 
tasks) 
PPVT 
CELF Sentence 
Structure and 
Formulated 
Sentences 
No correlations were observed for the Developmentally 
Delayed group.  
For the ASD group, ToM scores were correlated with 
narrative measures including number of propositions 
(1.12), and number of connectives (1.03).   (NB no clear 
division between formal and pragmatic narrative 
measures as this was not the focus of the study) 
 
Volden  et al., 
(2009)  
37, ASD, 
8;6  
TOPL 
VABS 
  CELF13 
 
70% of variance in TOPL was explained by a model 
including CELF expressive, CELF receptive and a non1
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(Communication 
and 
Socialization 
scales) 
ADOS 
communication  
verbal cognitive score. Only the CELF measures were 
significant predictors.  So combined formal language 
scores explain majority of variance in TOPL.  
CELF expressive, CELF receptive and TOPL account fo
30% of the overall variance in VABS Communication 
Scale. But TOPL did not explain unique variance. No 
predictive value of any measures for the Socialization 
scale.  
Only TOPL scores predicted ADOS communication.  
Whyte and 
Nelson (2015) 

26, ASD, 
9;8 
69, TD, 
8;10  
CASL  
(Pragmatic 
Judgment 
subtest and 
Nonliteral 
Language 
subtest) 
 
 
 
 Children’s 
version of the 
reading the 
mind in the 
eyes task 
(Baron1Cohen 
et al., 2001) 
Syntax 
construction 
subtest of the 
CASL  
Receptive and 
expressive 
vocabulary from 
Verbal IQ 
subtests from 
the Kaufman 
Brief 
Intelligence 
Test, 2
nd
 edition 
 
Pragmatic judgment scores were correlated with syntax 
scores both for TD children (2.87) and children with 
ASD (2.97) 
Pragmatic judgment scores were correlated with 
vocabulary scores both for TD children (3.22) and 
children with ASD (2.49) 
Pragmatic judgment scores were correlated with ToM 
scores both for TD children (1.39) and children with 
ASD (1.54) 
When controlling for vocabulary and syntax, ToM 
abilities were correlated with pragmatic judgment scores
for TD children (0.52) but not for children with ASD.  
Nonliteral language abilities were correlated with syntax
age for TD children (2.98), and for children with ASD 
(2.27). 
Nonliteral language abilities were correlated with 
vocabulary age for TD children (2.87), and for children 
with ASD (2.76). 
Nonliteral language abilities were correlated with TOM 
for TD children (1.76), and for children with ASD (1.35)
These correlations held when vocabulary and syntax 
were controlled for (TD 0.93, ASD 0.80) 
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47 Acronyms used in the table are as follows: 
 
+

TD = Typically Developing, ASD = Autism Spectrum Disorder, DLD = Developmental Language Disorder, SCD= Social Communication Disorder, FXS 
Fragile X Syndrome, WM = working memory, O = organization, CF = cognitive flexibility, I = inhibition, SC = self1control, P = planning 
 
+
ADOS1G = Autism Diagnostic Observation Schedule – General (Lord et al., 2000) 
CASL = Comprehensive Assessment of Spoken Language, (Carrow1Woolfolk, 1999) 
CCC, CCC2 = Children’s Communication Checklist 2 (Bishop, 2003) 
ELI = Evaluacion del Lenguaje Infantil (Saborit & Julian, 2005) 
LITMUS1MAIN  = Multilingual Assessment Instrument for Narratives (Gagarina et al., 2012) 
LUI = Language Use Inventory (O’Neill, 2009) 
MCDS = Mindful Conversational Difficulties Scale (Peterson, Garnett Kelly & Attwood, 2009) 
SCQ = Social Communication Questionnaire (Rutter, Bailey, & Lord, 2003) 
TOPL 1 Test of Pragmatic Language (Phelps1Terasaki & Phelps1Gunn, 1992) 
VABS 1 Vineland Adaptive Behavior Scales (Sparrow, Balla, Cicchetti, 1997) 

%


BRIEF  = Behavior Rating Inventory of Executive Functioning (Gioia, Isquith, Guy, & Ken orthy, 2000) 
DCCS = The Dimensional Change Card Sort (Zelazo, 2006) 
D1KEFS = Delis1Kaplan Eexecutive Function System (Delis et al., 2001) 
NEPSY1II  = Neuro1Psychological Assessment of Children (Korkman, Kirk, & Kemp, 2007) 
SWAN  = Strengths and Weaknesses of ADHD1Symptoms and Normal1 
Behavior rating scale. (Swanson, n.d.) 
WISC1IV  = Wechsler Intelligence Scale for Children (Wechsler, 2003) 
WJ Revised =  Woodcock–Johnson (Revised) Tests of Cognitive Ability (Woodcock, 1989) 
 
/

ESCS Early Social Communication Scale  (Mundy et al., 2003) 

&

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BPVS = The British picture vocabulary scale (Dunn  & Dunn, 2009) 
BSID Bayley Scales of Infant Development (Bayley, 1969) 
CDI (WG, WS) =  The MacArthur Bates Communicative Development Inventories (Words & Gestures, Words & Sentences. Fenson et al., 1996) 
CEG  = Comprension de Estructuras Gramaticales (Mendoza et al. 2005) 
CELF 4, CEFL Preschool 2 = Clinical Evaluation of Language Fundamentals  (Semel, Wiig, Secord, & Langdon, 2006).  
DELV1NR = Diagnostic Evaluation of Language Variation 1 Norm1Referenced (Seymour, Roeper, & de Villiers, 2005) 
ELI =   Evaluacion del Lenguaje Infantil (Saborit and Julian 2005) 
ISADYLE = Instruments pour le Screening et l'Evaluation Approfondie 
des Dysfonctionnements du Langage chez l'Enfant  (Piérart, Comblain, Gregoire, & Mousty, 2009) 
KBIT12 = Kaufman Brief Intelligence Test 12 (Kaufman & Kaufman, 2004) 
OWLS = Oral and Written Language Scales (Carrow1Woolfolk, 1995) 
PPVT (R, III) = Peabody Picture Vocabulary Test (multiple editions: Dunn & Dunn, 1981, 2007) 
TAK = Taaltoets Alle Kinderen Verhoeven & Vermeer, 2001)  
TOLD = Test of Language Development Primary 3
rd
 Edition (Newcomer & Hammill, 1997) 
WASI = Wechsler Abbreviated Scale of Intelligence (Wechsler, 1999) 
WPPSI  = Wechsler Preschool and Primary Scale of Intelligence (multiple editions: Wechsler, Scales & Index, 2012) 
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